Testimony of Abu Ahmad: An Islamic State Defector

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on October 2, 2014

A purported defector from the Islamic State, known only as “Abu Ahmad,” released testimony online on 5 April 2014 via the Syrian opposition news site al-Durar al-Shamiya under the heading, “The Concealed Truths About al-Baghdadi’s State”. Abu Ahmad describes himself as “one of the mujahideen in Khorasan [Afghanistan-Pakistan] and Iraq, and now in al-Sham [Syria],” and it is quite clear that Abu Ahmad has defected to al-Qaeda. On 25 September 2014, an English version of this testimony was posted on the Fund for Fallen Allies website. It has been reposted below—with some editions to transliteration and syntax—to avoid it being lost.

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I was in the al-Qaeda organization and after that I pledged allegiance to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi—may God have mercy on him—and after him Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. I was a diligent defender of his and, after I entered Syria, God exposed him to me.

Hence, I returned to my original organization, “Qaedat al-Jihad,” and I shall publish what I learned about this cunning person and his cronies. By God, it is not a state, but, rather, a mafia bloc to abort the Jihad of Syria.

Anyone who believes I am lying should wait, for tomorrow is near, and I have what will harm you, criminals of the al-Baghdadi state. You have murdered and spilled the blood of our brothers, the supporters of Syria and Iraq.

1. Thanks be to God, and prayers and peace be unto the Prophet of God. I will start writing with help from God about my first scramble and travel for jihad, and how I joined “Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad,” and I shall go into the details later.

2. Just before 2000, I joined the al-Qaeda organization, may God cherish it, and I went to Khorasan the proud, staying there until the blessed events of September [9/11].
3. After the events of September, we left our positions, and I was one of the 10 at the Kandahar airport in Afghanistan who remained alive. All the brothers who were with us there died, and we sustained severe injuries.
4. We were treated in Afghanistan and then sent to hospital in Pakistan, where we stayed for some time, before receiving orders to go to Baluchistan in Iran to complete our treatment there because it is safe.
5. Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi left Afghanistan for Kurdistan al-Iraq with his group. He had not yet pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, [had] not [yet] established “Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.”
6. I was not, up to that point, with Shaykh al-Zarqawi, may he rest in peace; I was following al-Qaeda only. After entering Baluchestan, Iran, I was arrested with some brothers, including “Muwahhid al-Masri.”
7. Months after our arrest, we did not have any identification papers, and the Iranian authorities provided us with Iraqi passports. We were sent to Malaysia so they could get rid of us.
8. A while after we left there, we coordinated with our brothers and returned to Iran also, but with forged passports other than the first ones. While in Iran, we received other passports with which we travelled.
9. After that, we travelled to Iraq before it was invaded by the Americans, and entered Kurdistan with Ansar al-Sunnah at the time. Shaykh [Abu Abdullah] al-Shafi’i, may God release him from prison, had by then split from “Kary Kar [Mullah Krekar],” emir of Ansar al-Islam.
10. We joined Shaykh al-Zarqawi, who had started to form the core of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad before the invasion, because he was sure that the Americans would invade Iraq, so he started preparing.
11. We started to train and prepare, while completing our treatment from our previous injuries in Afghanistan. After that, I left Iraq upon orders from the sheikh, and worked as a coordinator in many neighboring countries.
12. The invasion of Iraq started, and the Tawhid lion Zarqawi started to pound the edifices of the infidels day after day. After that, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was announced in an official statement, and it became stronger.
13. The sheikh thought about joining the Qaedat al-Jihad organization, may God cherish it, and he consulted the Shura Council. The issue was under deliberation and [the subject of] correspondence with Shaykh Usama, may God have mercy on his soul, for discussion.
14. What added to Shaykh al-Zarqawi’s worries was the financial weakness of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and the siege of his supporters from the Arabian Peninsula, so Shaykh al-Zarqawi was compelled to pledge allegiance quickly.
15. After pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, the rest of the brothers from al-Qaeda in Iraq joined his new organization and we became one organization, with coordination in many surrounding countries.
16. During this period (the Shaykh al-Zarqawi era), the organization was tough for all intelligence, internal and external, because the leaders of jihad at the time were well-known as far as their origins were concerned.
17. Every day, an agent who had managed to penetrate was executed after being directly exposed. He would always be a member and not an emir or a leader.
18. I will now talk about the assassination of Shaykh al-Zarqawi, and how the Iraq Islamic state was formed, and how it was first penetrated, and at what level the penetration was made.
19. A while after the [pledge of] allegiance of our courageous emir, al-Zarqawi, to Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, may he rest in peace, al-Zarqawi was killed after an act of treason by an Iraqi who was arrested during treatment.
20. I will be brief regarding the story of the killing of Shaykh al-Zarqawi because it is not the subject of this study. We delved into it many times and it is over, and the apostate who reported him was punished. After al-Zarqawi, Shaykh al-Muhajir took over.
21. After Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, may he rest in peace, took over, he used a different method from that of Shaykh al-Zarqawi in terms of secrecy, formations, and groupings, and started to work on the basis of power and empowerment.
22. After that, Shaykh al-Muhajir pledged allegiance in a surprising way to Shaykh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, who was not known in the organization as a leader, small or big. He was a normal person.
23. The first Shaykh al-Baghdadi was a normal person and not a leader, and everyone was surprised at al-Muhajir, because of the allegiance to him, and what his qualifications were.
24. Here is a letter from Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, judge of the state at the time, about the conditions before he ran away from the state to Khorasan because he was [being] pursued to be killed: http://justpaste.it/do3r
25. After the declaration of the state and [pledge of] allegiance to it, the state was joined by every Tom, Dick and Harry, and many of the Iraq battalions paid allegiance. Many of them joined to have a position, or to penetrate the state, which is more important.
26. Many officers from the Ba’athist Iraqi army who split and repented joined the state, but they maintained the Ba’ath mentality, whether they knew this or not.
27. The state was also joined by many members of the Islamic army and al-Ishrin revolution battalions. Some of them entered with Saudi orders, and orders from Syria and Izzat al-Duri and Abu Ali al-Kahlili.
28. Abu Ali al-Kahlili was an officer in the Palestinian organizations in Iraq during the time of Saddam, and, after returning to Syria, he coordinated with state security intelligence to lead action in Iraq.
29. As a result of these public penetrations and our feeling that we are an empowered state, and dealing with the rest of the battalions on this basis, everyone was against us, and the Sahwa [Awakening] started.
30. Al-Sahwa is an all-encompassing name for all those who fought us, Muslims and infidels, although we treated them as infidels, considering their lives and wealth as prey, killing whoever was around them, may God forgive us.
31. With poor communications and lack of clarity in [terms of] vision and objective, and the weakness of our organizational work and the fragility of the structure built on the basis of consolidation, we continued to believe we were right and remained patient.
32. As the weakness increased, the control of those who penetrated us increased, practically. We started to be shifted back and forth between the hands of the Iraqi Ba’ath and the Syrian intelligence.
33. After we would finish a job, we would discover that it was in the interest of one specific group or another, although it was in appearance in support of Islam. Many of our bombings against the opposition turned out to be in favor of the opposition, with the detention of Sunni youth by the hundreds.
34. After that, both sheikhs, al-Muhajir and al-Baghdadi, were killed, and, as the WikiLeaks of the al-Baghdadi state said in detail, most leaders were killed together, and Abu Bakr was selected in an even worse way.
35. The selection of Abu Bakr was worse than [that of] his predecessor. He was neither known to us nor to most of the brothers, the leaders. Because of secrecy and weak communication, each person would think that so and so had selected him.
36. After al-Baghdadi was selected, I cannot deny that we made a quantum leap, but, as usual, there was a trap and a cemetery for us. Too much blowing causes an explosion, and our esteemed emir is a quick blower.
37. After that, God decided that the revolution in Syria take place, and it represented to us the annunciation. An order came from Dr. Ayman to form a group and send it to Syria, and al-Nusra was born.
38. Agreement was reached on many issues with al-Jolani—may God protect him—when traveling to Damascus, regarding the idea of work and the way to deal with the people of Syria, and how to avoid mistakes.

I will talk about them at the time.

39. Who is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who reigns over the State of Islam of Iraq and the Levant? How did he arrive as he did?! I will mention his story in detail with dates and places.
40. Ibrahim Bin Awwad al-Badri from the Bu Badri tribe. He was born in Samarra and lived there. God knows, I researched his lineage, and asked all kinds of people, and stayed at it for a while.
41. I stopped longer when I learned that the owner of the Alawi Noble Lineage Research Association is accused of practicing Shia, and he is the one who said: The Bu Badri is not from Quraysh or from the people of Al al-Bayt.
42. God then guided me to a brother in the struggle who is knowledgeable of lineage, who emphasized to me that the Bu Badri tribe and its members are not from the Al al-Bayt or from Quraysh. Our friend Abu Bakr is not from Baghdad or even from Quraysh.
43. As for the studying done by Abu Du’a, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, according to his lies, he studied at the Saddam Islamic University, and submitted his Doctorate dissertation in the science of Tajwid [method of reciting the Koran] and never received it, to begin with.
44. He is not a doctor of Sharia, not from Baghdad, not from Quraysh, and not from the lineage of al-Hasan and al-Husayn, but being from Quraysh became a cliché to be related to the emir of the Daesh [Arabic acronym for the ISIS], and not the other way around. This is a lie from Daesh.
45. The Emir al-Mumineen [Commander of the Faithful], as they claim, who is reigning over the people of Syria now, ran away from Iraq at the start of the American invasion, lived in Damascus, in Sayyida Zaynab, and stayed there for three years until 2006.
46. He stayed three years in Syria, running away from jihad in Iraq. These three years were the years of recruiting informers, and most of those detained as agents were recruited at that time.
47. One of al-Baghdadi’s best friends in Sayyida Zaynab was Abu Faysal al-Zaydi, the cousin of Mu’adh Safuk, agent of the Syrian regime, and Abu al-Qa’qa the second, who introduced Mu’adh to him.
48. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi returned to Iraq in in 2006. He had a brother-in-law (husband of the sister of al-Baghdadi’s wife), who was the leader of a faction (Ansar al-Tawhid), which is part of the Army of Mujahideen in Iraq.
49. The brother-in-law was a pious man, and Shaykh al-Zarqawi, may he rest in peace, used to love and respect him. Al-Zarqawi never met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, because he was killed when al-Baghdadi was in Damascus.
50. Abu Bakr returned to Iraq and never met al-Zarqawi, because he was killed, and he met Shaykh Muharib al-Jiburi, may God have mercy on his soul, because he used to know him from Damascus. The sheikh visited Syria many times.
51. After part of this faction pledged allegiance to the state following its declaration, al-Baghdadi pledged allegiance to the state, and worked with Shaykh Muharib al-Jiburi. Shortly after that, he was arrested and jailed for years.
52. After being imprisoned, he came across the doctrine of the brotherhood in prison. Al-Baghdadi’s tone was Sufi Ash’ari, as per the doctrine of the Saddam University. He knew nothing about governance and the checks of expiation anything.
53. After leaving prison (of course, it was not a long period, because he knows no one and no one knows him, because he was arrested shortly after arriving in Iraq), he joined the state again.
54. Al-Baghdadi worked at a post office for the state. One of the brothers would come and throw the mail by hand into his house’s courtyard, and another brother would come and pick up the mail, without either party having any knowledge of the other.
55. During this period, brigadiers general, Muhammad al-Nada al-Jiburi, from the village of Sudayrah, who was known as al-Ra’i [“the shepherd”], and Samir Abid Muhammad (Haji Bakr), a member of the command of the Ba’ath Party Brigade, who was killed in Syria by the mujahideen, came out of prison.
56. Al-Ra’i was given the command of the joint staff of the Islamic state in Iraq at the time, and he appointed his colleague in training and friend in the Ba’ath, Haji Bakr, as his second in command. A short while later, al-Ra’i was killed.
57. The two sheikhs, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, knew al-Ra’i personally, but had never met Haji Bakr at all. After al-Ra’i was killed, Haji Bakr was given command.
58. He was given command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon the mandate of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, although they only know him from the recommendation of al-Ra’i. The reason was that the two sheikhs were staying away from people due to the security situation.
59. I will continue now on how the two sheikhs, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, were killed, and how Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) took over in detail.
60. The two sheikhs, after General al-Ra’i left, remained seven months in one place, where they were killed, along with their assistants and some leaders. They communicated with nobody except through Manaf al-Rawi.
61. Manaf al-Rawi was the wali [provincial governor] of Baghdad, and he is almost the only person of trust and the oldest among the rest of the new emirs of Baghdad, who were called by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir “Emirs of necessity” due to their inexperience.
62. Manaf al-Rawi was the one who coordinated and distributed the mail. One of the mail houses was the house of Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i Abu Bakr, and he did not know the two parties, the sender and the receiver.
63. During these seven months, al-Ra’i was killed, and he was the commander of chiefs of staff of the state at the time. The Ba’athist general, Haji Bakr, was given command. He had been jailed before due to his relationship with Izzat al-Duri.
64. Seven months later, one of the mail delivery people who knew the house of Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i was arrested. He knew the house of Manaf al-Rawi. When the messenger was arrested, one of the security people of Baghdad came and told Abu Awwad al-Samarra’i that the messenger was killed, saying he knew Manaf al-Rawi’s house, and to tell someone of that. But he said his was only a mail house.
65. And I do not know anyone. He said, verbatim: “Someone like me is not told anything, perhaps the messenger [not further identified]. The security man left with tears in his eyes.
66. As a result, the messenger admitted [the information] about Manaf al-Rawi, the wali of Baghdad, and then about the location of the two sheikhs, who were killed together with a group of commanders and assistants—may God have mercy on them.
67. There was great confusion in the lines of the brothers, and arrests covered all areas of Iraq as a result of the deaths of the two sheikhs, and the arrest of al-Rawi and others. The only person remaining in the field was Haji Bakr.
68. Haji Bakr is a fox of a man (he was fed the Ba’ath Party’s line and cunning at birth). He resorted to a wicked idea. He corresponded with each official separately, making him believe that he had consulted the others and they had agreed to the appointment of Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i as an emir instead of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. Most emirs agreed without knowing the mailman, thinking that he is old and has experience.
69. Thinking that Abu Du’a is a man of sharia and an old companion of al-Zarqawi, and that he is a Qurayshi, Husayni, and Baghdadi, most emirs who were let go later on in [went in] different ways, some of which will be mentioned later.
70. I shall continue about al-Baghdadi’s Ba’athist group:

Abu Ahmad al-Alwani

Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Bilawi

Abu Sayf al-Maslawi

Abu Aqil al-Hamadani, and others.

71. With God’s help I will continue [to tell] the truth about Daesh and al-Samarra’i the liar, pretending to be a Qurayshi and to belong to Al al-Bayt, and what the foundations of his Ba’athist government are.
72. A short while after Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) took over the Emirate of the Faithful, one of the former Ba’ath officers came out of prison. Before his imprisonment, he had paid allegiance to the state. He is Abu Muhannad al-Suwaydawi, a Ba’ath general from Saddam’s army, who was arrested for his relationship with Izzat al-Duri. During his last days before being arrested, he joined the state for a week, and then was arrested, and, after leaving prison, he complained about the appointment of Haji Bakr as a military commander of the organization. Al-Samarra’i wanted to appease him and convince Abu Bakr to leave his position to him, and Haji Bakr was frozen for a while.

73. Al-Suwaydawi worked hard when he came out of prison and received his assignment as a military commander. He left no civilian or military person without bombing him. The important thing was the emir’s happiness with the large number of bombings.
74. During this period, it was noticed that courage was rampant, [ready] to spill Muslim blood, with the excuse of becoming entrenched in Iraq. It had a huge reaction against the mujahideen, with the exception of the Church operation, committed by mistake.
75. After a short while, a group of Ba’ath officers was released from al-Maliki’s prisons, led by General Abu Muslim. They opened the prison files of al-Suwaydawi, and his investigations and talk, so he was let go, in order to appease them.
76. General Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, originally from Tall Afar, was hugely loyal to Saddam, and Izzat al-Duri after him. He was detained for a long time because of his obstinacy and commitment to the Ba’ath.
77. This general, and his companions of the Ba’ath officers in prison, were a spearhead in distorting the methodology of al-Qaeda in the prisons, and they attacked and hurt the brothers in prison in Iraq.
78. The person that was most hurt in prison was the sheikh with priority in jihad, Abu Ritaj al-Iraqi, known as Abu Zaynab also, the companion of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, may he rest in peace.
79. Abu Ritaj al-Iraqi was famous for saying about the Ba’ath officers who were in prison with him: “The pens of the Ba’ath still drip with our blood, so how can they command us?” He was among those most ready to warn against them.
80. Along with Shaykh Abu Ritaj in opinion in the state were Abu Abd-al-Rahman al-Kimi, Shaykh Haji Rashid, Abu Umar Haifa, Shaykh al-Mayahi, Shaykh Abu Mansur, and Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Azzawi.

Note:

Shaykh al-Mayahi is Shaykh Abu Mariya al-Iraqi [a.k.a. Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, whose real name is Maysar al-Jiburi], the general shari’a judge of Jabhat al-Nusra at present.

81. Also with Shaykh Abu Ritaj were Shaykh Abu Asia, Shaykh al-Harawi, and Shaykh Abu Bara al-Kurdi, and an elite of the organization’s young men who had been in prison and were just out of it.
82. To give you a brief about the Ba’ath officers during Saddam’s time, so that you know the reason behind the repulsion of the jihadist youth from working with Daesh now (because its commanders are Ba’athists totally, as a shura council).
83. Salafis were arrested during the days of Saddam, and the first thing done to them before the investigation was to break a limb or two with stones. He would remain, throughout his imprisonment, without treatment, not to mention being burned with melting plastic.
84. One of the informants, who was working for the Iraqi intelligence, repented and admitted to the brothers, saying: “When I would return to Baghdad, I would be put in a room where I would fornicate and drink alcohol, and step on the Koran.”
85. An agent returning from penetrating groups of brothers would be put in a room with an opening in the ceiling from which he would take food. He could only reach it by arranging Korans and stepping on them.
86. Hence, there was animosity before, during, and after prison among the mujahideen with the right faith and the Ba’athists of Saddam who now lead Daesh.
87. What was announced a while ago (about Jabhat al-Murabitin in Iraq), and that it contains many Salafi fighters with good faith and who are not Ba’athist (I preach the nation with it). Malik al-Utaybi Abu Talhah. [previous sentence as received]
88. After Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (Abu Umar al-Turkmani) took over as a general supervisor of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, he wanted to get rid of the most dangerous man, Haji Bakr.
89. He was sent to Syria as an assistant to Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i. He was really the shadow man in Syria, and was very active in a number of pivotal issues.
90. Abu Muslim al-Turkmani remained a general supervisor and is managing the battles in Iraq now. I will mention some issues that have to do with the Turkomans of Iraq, and the way they deal with al-Qaeda as Arabs.
91. The Turkomans of Iraq and Tall Afar particularly hate Arabs in general, and try to get out from Iraq as a state and to separate. They had a fight with al-Qaeda fighters and killed some of them.
92. Among the most important figures killed at the hands of the Turkoman were brother Abu Sayf al-Ubaydi al-Mawsili, the security person of the al-Qaeda organization during the days of al-Zarqawi—may he rest in peace. He was killed by Abd-al-Rahim al-Turkmani.
93. Abd-al-Rahim al-Turkmani was the worst enemy of al-Qaeda, who carried the banner of fighting against the Islamist jihadists. The surprise is that he is now the real emir of Daesh in al-Deir.
94. Abd-al-Rahim is currently the Daesh emir in Deir Ezzor, and his nickname is Abd al-Nasir, and most of those with him do not know that he fought al-Qaeda. He is against its methodology and against all jihadists.
95. Among the very few who know that Abd al-Nasir is Abd-al-Rahim, the criminal who fought against al-Qaeda, is Abu Ayman al-Iraqi. He knows that he is the same person but covers for him.
96. Abu Ayman al-Iraqi was an informant with the Saddam intelligence before the fall, and he is not the one in the picture that was published. This person was killed in Syria.
97. This Abu Ayman is a wicked Ba’athist, who absorbed the Ba’athist thought. It is not acceptable for him to be left when he wants to reach higher levels with the Ba’ath through penetrating the Islamists.
98. After the fall of Saddam, Abu Ayman (Ali Aswad al-Jiburi) was detained in al-Maliki’s prison for a month, and then left for some time. This method is known among the security people as a method of renewing and polishing.
99. This Abu Ayman is now one of the leaders of Daesh. He is a member of DAI’SH’s higher military council, and has been known to utter words of blasphemy time and time again. Many of the brothers were witness to this.
100. He said many times: He does not want the rule of God and wants the rule [law] of the jungle. The strange thing is that some of the sheep with him heard him and turned a blind eye.

(Despite the fact that they render even the air as infidel).

101. Abu Ayman al-Iraqi al-Jiburi killed unjustly: (Shaykh Isam al-Ra’i, jihadist Umar Balush, and Shaykh Jalal Bayirli, and he executed several of the jihadists of al-Hijrah Ila Allah without trial after he gave them amnesty, may God have mercy on them).

This happened on the Syrian coast, before they left the enclaves and fled to al-Raqqa.

102. I will explain the linkages:

Abu Ayman and Abu Muslim.

The killed: Haji Bakr, Abu Suhayb al-Iraqi, and Abu Yihyah, and their links to Izzat al-Duri, the method of work, and the agreements.

103. I begin by clarifying the Syrian intelligence’s theories of working with the surrounding reality and the method of using those around it, particularly the jihadist organizations, and, particularly, the stupid ones.
104. Al-Asad’s intelligence has prior experience, particularly in Lebanon. Al-Asad managed to tame 18 sects, from which dozens of organizations branch out for his regime, by terrorizing, enticing, and carrying out deceit.
105. The Ba’ath regime attempts to penetrate the organizations that support it and does not antagonize it: First: To manage them. Second: To destroy them. Third: To avoid their evils currently and in future.
106. The Ba’ath regime penetrated most of the jihadist organizations that have operated in the Syria arena since the beginning of Islamic action, particularly those that adopt jihad [word indistinct], luring Adnan Uqlah.
107. The Ba’ath regime has recently penetrated the jihadist system with several persons, including: (The doomed Mahmud Qawl Aghasi Abu al-Qa’qa, Mu’adh al-Safuk, and Badran al-Hishan in Deir Ezzor.
108. The thing that we are interested in mentioning here is the Ba’ath’s penetration of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Daesh. The regime adopted two completely separate methods for recruitment in order to ensure the outcome.
109. It recruited the Syrians who are living near the Iraqi borders, including Badran al-Hishan and his group, who are working to date. The Americans arrested him in 2008 and deposited him in prison in Iraq, after which he escaped from prison and returned to his state, Daesh, to be an official as he used to be, an emir of the emirate of the border area for years, later in Syria.
110. The regime adopted a second method, which is the use of pressure. This was done by recruiting Iraqi refugees in Syria and planting them within the ranks of the mujahideen. They would usually have a combatant mentality against the Americans.
111. Among those who were recruited were senior officers from the leaders of the Ba’ath during Saddam’s days, including al-Duri, the leaders of Palestinian factions, particularly the Abu Nidal group that left Iraq.
112. The Syrian regime facilitated the entry of the mujahideen into Iraq for several reasons, most important of which was to pressure the Americans so as to not end [the war in] Iraq and Syria’s turn would come next as planned, and, second, to plant the agents within the ranks of the jihadists, and, third, to get rid of the mujahideen, who constitute pressure and a threat to the Syrian regime in Damascus.
113. The Ba’ath regime used to facilitate the entry of suicide bombers into Iraq and to arrest those returning to Syria, after leaks provided by its spies, such as Badran al-Hishan.
114. One of the spies of the Syrian regime achieved a high rank in Baghdad and became its security official, to whom all reports were submitted, and he had a direct connection with Badran.
115. Some of those who joined the state at the time were (Ba’athists from among the worshippers of Saddam). However, their ranks were never raised, because of the presence of old leaders from Khorasan who had clear methodology and ideology.
116. After the deaths of the two sheikhs and takeover by Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i, the Ba’athist presence spread and expanded and assumed positions in the state, [people] such as the doomed Haji Bakr, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, Abu Ahmad al-Alawani, Abu Muhannad al-Suwaydawi, and Abu Ayman al-Iraqi al-Jiburi. The regime had dealt with them before the Syrian revolution on the basis that they were the Ba’ath’s support there, in Iraq.
117. Yet, after the revolution of Syria, the regime started to call in its debt from them. It had supported them for many years and the orders of the Syrian regime matched the ambitions of expansion of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
118. Yes, al-Baghdadi’s ignorance and political short-sightedness agreed with what the regime wanted of this stupid state, Daesh. He leaked very important and pivotal orders for merging the Iraqi and Syria arenas.
119. The objective of the regime at that time was to prove Jabhat al-Nusra’s affiliation with al-Qaeda and Daesh. To succeed in doing so, the Shura of Daesh must convince al-Baghdadi about declaring the expansion, and agreed with him.
120. I will not talk about Jabhat al-Nusra now, how it was established, how Shaykh al-Jolani was nominated, who nominated him, what the nomination words were, and what the purpose was. May God repay him well.
121. The most important persons who communicate with the Syrian regime now and coordinate with it on the targets and the plans are: Abu Ayman al-Iraqi al-Jiburi, al-Turkmani, who is the security person now, and the doomed Haji Bakr. The doomed man was the arrowhead of the planning and coordination with the Ba’ath regime. His passport was confiscated when he was killed and it showed entries to Iran and Scandinavian countries.
122. Haji Bakr had entered with his real name and photo. A short while before his death, he carried out a big tour of Europe!! All these pictures will be presented, God willing.
123. Upon his arrival in Syria, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi arrested several brothers, including leaders, and tortured them to death. He was telling them “you want freedom,” and tortured them non-stop with a grudge.
124. What was being done by Abu Ayman the Ba’athist was told by one of the brothers who had fled from Daesh and who used to participate in the torture unwillingly. He used to wonder: Do al-Jiburi’s words stem from Islam?
125. Abu Ayman used to tell the detainees when he first arrived from Iraq: I have a list of 100 names for assassination and liquidation. Most of them are jihadist leaders on the coast. So, where did he get the names when he is Iraqi?!
126. He immediately started with the assassination of the leader, Isam Ra’i, and he tried to assassinate Abu Rahhal—may God save him—because he was going to launch the battle of the coast against al-Nasiriyah, and he clashed with Ahrar al-Sham when the members were planning for the invasion.
127. This is in addition to helping Abu Ayman in his assistance to the regime’s agent, Nadim Balush, who was a prisoner and sentenced to death as punishment for killing Captain Riyadh al-Ahmad and his rejection of his agency with the regime. Nadim Balush is the owner of the al-Abd al-Gharib Facebook account. Nadim Balush’s Twitter account and WikiLeaks account is [in the name of] Saydanayah. He is known to be an agent, even when he was in prison.
128. Nadim Balush is one of the media mouthpieces for Daesh and one of the most important warriors for all the jihadist groups in Syria, as he implements the wishes of his masters in the Ba’ath.
129. Now, God willing, I will start to talk about Shaykh Ali, who was recommended by Shaykh al-Zarqawi—God have mercy on him—out of six persons to be the point of reference for matters, and he is the only one who is alive now.
130. Before Shaykh al-Zarqawi’s death, he recommended six persons, to whom the organization would refer to resolve and decide on issues, and Shaykh Ali was one of them, and he was detained for a while.
131. Shaykh Ali got out of prison after the two sheikhs were killed. He found that the Islamic State of Iraq had returned to the Ba’athist State of Iraq with the presence of Ba’ath officers in all positions.
132. Therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Abu Muslim al-Turkmani was appointed general supervisor, while Lieutenant Colonel al-Bilawi was appointed a military commander for the organization. Lieutenant Colonel Abu Ahmad al-Alawani was appointed a wali [provincial governor under the Islamic Caliphate] of Diyala and a security coordinator. Lieutenant Colonel Abu Umar al-Nu’aymi was appointed a wali of al-Ramadi. Lieutenant Colonel Abu Aqil Mawsil was appointed a wali of Mosul and Haji Bakr was named assistant to al-Baghdadi. They have become a Ba’ath state with beards and miswak [a twig used as a traditional toothbrush and reportedly used by the Prophet].
133. This choir that rule the Islamic Ba’ath State decided, after Shaykh Ali got out of prison, to bring him [in] so he would polish their image. He ran with his religion from the Ba’ath state, as he described it himself.
134. Shaykh Ali hid from them, as they were looking for him, and he remained concealed until Jabhat al-Nusra began its work in Syria. So, he decided to communicate with them, because he knew al-Jolani in prison and learned about his religion, his mind, and his understanding of the reality and politics. He communicated with them, but did not pledge allegiance, and worked as a supervisor and big brother, giving advice and assistance.
135. Shaykh Ali, who is in Syria, wanted [to find] a way to Khorasan and did not want any reminders of the Iraq tragedy and those who were managing the situation there. This is when al-Baghdadi learned of his presence in Syria.
136. Al-Baghdadi asked Shaykh al-Jolani to send Shaykh Ali to meet with him, even for days. He pledged not to harass him, and told them that he wanted to see him to give him what he wanted.
137. Shaykh al-Jolani informed Shaykh Ali of the message and advised him to not return to Iraq, because the officers are persons of treachery and they would not let him go if he did not do what they wanted.
138. Shaykh Ali decided to go to them, thinking that he would fix what the Ba’ath ruined and then he would travel to Khorasan. He met al-Baghdadi, who did not respond to any request regarding the officers in his state. The sheikh left and did not stay with them. One day later, his house was raided upon a tip-off from the Syrian intelligence, as was published at the time, and he is now a prisoner and will most likely be executed.
139. Of course, Shaykh Ali’s arrest was because he refused to polish the image of the Ba’ath state, so he was reported to the Syrians through the officers, who informed the al-Maliki government.
140. Of the words that Shaykh Ali—may God free him—had uttered during his first imprisonment was: “Shame on us to give the rule to Ba’ath officers.” His words, of course, came after their repentance, as they claimed.
141. Among those who were of the same opinion as Shaykh Ali was Shaykh al-Miyahi—may God save him. He said of al-Baghdadi’s state: “A Ba’athist state with an Islamic tint.” He hated the state’s officers.
142. Al-Miyahi—may God save him—was one of the students of Shaykh Subhi al-Samarra’i, may God have mercy on him, who had fled with his religion, and now Shaykh al-Miyahi fled with his religion from al-Maliki and al-Baghdadi.
143. At this time, the Islamic Ba’ath State pursued everyone with a value in Iraq to either join them or be hurt. One of those they pursued was Shaykh Abu al-Harith (Arab al-Jubur).
144. They came to him and he refused to join the Islamic Ba’ath State. They forced him to write and sign a paper that basically said that he “is a coward and abandoned jihad,” and said that they would publish it if he talked about them.
145. Some people curse me and others ask me, and I answer with the words: Use your heads. I am giving you the names of Sunni imams in Iraq and their opinions. Ask them if I am telling lies about them.
146. I mention the story of Abu Ali al-Anbari, how he was expelled from Ansar al-Islam, how he joined al-Qaeda, and what he did. Is he really from Anbar or a liar like his Shaykh al-Baghdadi?
147. As a beginning, I would like to answer anyone who asks why we are publishing this now. We are publishing it now because we have only managed to gather all this information now. Things did not become clear until now.
148. This includes:

To anyone who accuses al-Jolani of knowing what we mentioned, keeping quiet about it, and dealing with Daesh, I respond: “The sheikh had doubts when he was in Iraq and the picture has become clear for him now.

149. Abu Ali al-Anbari, al-Baghdadi’s first deputy, is now in Syria, and he is the malicious and real face of Daesh and the direct official for the sharia and security committees.
150. Abu Ali Qardash al-Turkmani, or al-Anbari, as he is called, has nothing to do with al-Anbar, near or far. He was a Ba’athist activist and a commander of a company during the days of Saddam in Iraq.
151. Qardash, who was called Abu Ala Qardash, worked as a teacher of physics in Saddam’s era, in addition to holding responsibility for the infidel Ba’athist partisan company.
152. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Iraq, may God save him, says: “I have seen people in prison who claim they are students of science, and some of them were truly students, but Qardash thinks that he is the only scientist, and he is ignorant.”
153. After Saddam’s fall, Qardash, Abu Ali al-Anbari, joined the Ansar al-Islam group and remained with them for a short while. After that, he was expelled on financial and administrative charges.
154. After that, he joined Qaedat al-Jihad along with the members of his company who were expelled with him. Three months later, he was appointed a coordinator among the groups.
155. After a while, and being the coordinator between Baghdad and the groups, his command assigned him to travel. Another brother was assigned to the emirate of Mosul, and so he traveled and assigned one of his relatives in his place.
156. One month after he was assigned to inform the brother about taking over the Mosul emirate and to appoint another in his stead, the brother emir was summoned to meet with the leadership, and at the time Shaykh al-Zarqawi did not know.
157. Abu Ali Qardash al-Anbari came to the brother who was assigned by the leadership and begged him to meet them as the emir and not to expose him. So the brother was kind and met with them.
158. After a little while, Shaykh al-Zarqawi—may God have mercy on him—found out about al-Anbari’s trick and removed him and his family member. He also ordered that no person with him would ever be assigned to any emirate, because those with him were like him.
159. Among those who came to the organization with al-Anbari at the time was: Abu Mariam al-Kurdi and his brother Abu Hamudi, Abu Umar al-Nu’aymi, Abu Huda al-Kurdi, Lieutenant Colonel Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, and Abd-al-Nasir.
160. This Abd-al-Nasir is the one that I mentioned before as being the emir of Daesh in al-Deir. He is the one who killed the security person from al-Qaeda, Abu Sayf—may God have mercy on him—in Iraq during the days of al-Zarqawi.
161. As for Abu Mariam al-Kurdi and his brother, Abu Hamudi, they were agents for the Americans and the Kurdish intelligence in the north, and they penetrated the organization. I will say soon how they were discovered.
162. In his testimony on YouTube about his former organization, Daesh, Shaykh Abu Shu’ayb al-Masri mentioned that he met al-Anbari several times and described him as an ignorant person with no knowledge whatsoever.
163. What we now want from the official of the sharia people in Daesh, al-Anbari al-Turkmani, is to issue us a letter of original ideology that shows his Sharia methodology and the volume of his knowledge.
164. We want him to show us summaries of books that he read for the Sunni scholars and leaders in Iraq, whether when he was free or in prison, and he had many scholars with him if he was being truthful.
165. Some people object to my saying that these people were Ba’athists and were officers for Saddam, saying: Did they not repent? Why do you speak about them like that?
166. Repentance is certainly accepted by God and people, but repentance has conditions, most important of which is have remorse about killing the Muslims, whose blood was shed before, and not to be excessive in the killings now. This is in addition to what they are doing now, in terms of implementing the requests of the Ba’ath Syria in order to abort the jihad of Syria and coordinating with the Syrian intelligence, particularly Haji Bakr, al-Alawani, and others. Moreover, the repentant from major apostasy [indistinct] is not given senior positions and is not used to carry arms, let alone be given the leadership of the two states of Iraq and Syria. The first thing that the repentant from apostasy does is to show appreciation for the scholars, particularly those he was fighting when in the days of his apostasy, such as al-Zawahiri, and not the opposite, contesting them, rebelling against them, and defecting. The repentant from apostasy walks on the path of the people of jihad, and does not contest them and move away from their methodology, and follows the way of the Kharijites. After all, they are Ba’athists who fake religion and then are exposed.
167. We hereby continue, with God’s help. I have surprises for you later, particularly regarding Emir al-Mu’minin, al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi al-Husayni, who does not have the slightest power, as well as Abu Ahmad al-Alawani, the agent of the Ba’ath, and al-Adnani.
168. As for the leaking of images of the mujahideen’s slaughter, the mutilation of their bodies, and their brutal killing, like what happened with Abu Rayyan, it was an intentional action taken by the leadership of Daesh of the Ba’ath, not to scare the violator, but to stir public opinion against the Islamists, because they claimed that they represent Islam and the aspired-for state of Islam, as well as to anger the Islamic battalions against the muhajirun [“migrants”; the foreign fighters].
169. The muhajirun, who are with Daesh, are sheep moving along upon the orders of the infidel Ba’ath, listening, obeying, and implementing. The Ba’ath’s purpose in this is to exhaust those who have come to truly and genuinely fight against Bashar. This way, the Ba’ath would kill the muhajirun who came to fight Bashar and would kill the Ansari and the muhajirun with him instead of them fighting with Bashar. Therefore, the Ba’ath would strike them against one another and exhaust them.
170. The leaders of al-Ahrar and the front became aware of this Ba’athist scheme. God only knows that I told them about it. They tried to avoid fighting Daesh many times, but Daesh’s knife became lethal.
171. The Ba’ath is one of the most dangerous organizations, particularly when it is led by Nusayris and Damascus intelligence personnel. Whoever denies their intelligence efforts must refer to history and they will see the number of schemes that they penetrated and aborted.
172. al-Baghdadi is demanding that we accept the repentance of the Ba’athist officers, who unwillingly left Saddam’s army after it was destroyed. Yet, he does not accept the repentance of the officers who willingly left Bashar’s army.
173. With some reservations regarding the repentance of the officers of the Free Syrian Army and not declaring the repentance and innocence from the Ba’ath, as well as making decisions in accordance with the opposite of what God dictated as a ruling methodology, the original issue is innocence and announcing it.

Continuation without numbering

We will talk about the WikiLeaks account of the state of al-Baghdadi [refers to WikiBaghdadi], and the level and truthfulness of his information, and about the meetings of Abu Du’a al-Samarra’i al-Baghdadi, who he met with when the meetings were kept in the dark.

The WikiLeaks of al-Baghdadi’s state is for a Jazrawi person from the peninsula of the two holy shrines who penetrates Daesh and whose information—most times—is accurate, except for when the organization lies to its members.

One of the mistakes that the Jazrawi brother committed was what he wrote about the organization’s deliberate leak that al-Jolani refused to meet al-Baghdadi and did not meet him when he came to Syria.

Daesh’s purpose in this lie to its members was to distort al-Jolani’s image, by saying that would not sit with al-Baghdadi to resolve the existing conflict between them.

This is all a lie, because al-Jolani met al-Baghdadi when he came to Syria, and al-Baghdadi presented his project of merging the two countries to al-Jolani, who rejected it, reminding him of his condition that the work of Syria would be connected to Khorasan through Iraq and would not be under the state, and that this expansion is not in favor of jihad at all. Al-Baghdadi was silent.

Then, Zakur, the emir of Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo, who was one of the first founders of al-Nusra, and his jihadist history is of great value, began to speak. I will not mention him in detail, out of fear for him.

In the meeting, al-Baghdadi greatly praised Shaykh al-Jolani, so much so that he described him as “a nation of his own merit.” This stirred the jealousy and ill will of al-Adnani, who never missed an opportunity to kiss the feet of al-Baghdadi. Why this praise from his al-Baghdadi for the two men?!

It was said by someone who attended the first meeting between al-Adnani and al-Baghdadi that al-Adnani kissed the feet of al-Baghdadi, thinking that he was a Qurayshi Husayni.

In the same meeting, al-Baghdadi praised Shaykh Abu Mariyah al-Jiburi, saying that he is “an army of his own merit,” commending him, as well as bringing him close in the council with the aim of splitting him from al-Jolani. Abu Mariyah is the muhajir al-Qahtani stranger, the sharia person of al-Nusra.

Moreover, al-Baghdadi praised all the members of Shaykh al-Jolani’s Shura Council during the meeting. After that, he sat separately with some of them, enticing them to split from al-Jolani, in order to achieve the expansion and be successful. When most of them refused, al-Baghdadi threatened Shaykh Abu Mariya al-Jiburi with booby-traps and silencers. Al-Jiburi insisted on his rejection, so al-Baghdadi offered him al-Jolani’s position. Abu Mariya refused, took his leave, and left.

After that, al-Baghdadi sent Abu Ali al-Anbari to Shaykh Abu Mariya, offering his apologies regarding his threat to use explosive belts, booby-traps, and silencers.

After all this, Shaykh al-Jolani and al-Baghdadi agreed to keep the matter as it was and pledged to wait under the separation of Khorasan. Two days later, everyone was surprised by the announcement.

Al-Baghdadi declared his two states of Iraq and Syria. (He cannot deliver any Friday sermons in either of them, not even once.)

Later on, an urgent message came from Shaykh Ayman—may God save him—ordering the two parties to be quiet and to deal with the issue on the basis of it being prior to the announcement. Then, Daesh came along.

A separate message came to al-Baghdadi, which he read in front of two persons only, Haji Bakr and al-Anbari. He ordered them not to reveal its contents, but Haji Bakr talked about it in detail with Abu Bakr Umar al-Qahtani, the state’s sharia person in Aleppo.

Al-Qahtani, as is the habit of the Jazrawiyin who cannot keep any secrets, told some of his companions about it, including the person who opened the WikiLeaks account. The message was from Shaykh al-Zawahiri.

The following was in the message to al-Baghdadi: “Is this a pious loyal action. You have jumped at the emirate. Fear God and remain as you were, until I follow this with another.”

Al-Baghdadi and his Shura Council sent a message through Abu Ibrahim al-Askari in Daesh, clarifying and saying: “I swear to Almighty God that if there was an order from Shaykh al-Zawahiri to return to Iraq, I would kiss the heads of the Syrian brothers and return from where I came without hesitating.”

He lied.

The person who instigated him the most not to accept the order of Shaykh al-Zawahiri was Haji Bakr, saying: Are we going to link the affairs of our state with an old man in Khorasan?! He instigated everyone to reject it.

I pray to God, Haji Bakr, to have vengeance against you and to torture you with every drop of Muslim blood that was shed because of your disobedience to Emir al-Zawahiri and your incitement of the dissention in Syria. Amen.

Daesh’s current agents:

The Ba’ath regime called on the help of its Islamic troops of al-Dawa’ish after the defeats of the battle of al-Anfar. Daesh mobilized against Deir Ezzor and Markadah in order to ease the pressure on the Bashar regime.

Of course, Daesh knew that the mujahideen would not attack al-Raqqa with heavy weapons, so it sent the majority of its forces to invade al-Dayr, while al-Raqqa remained under the mercy of the checkpoints.

All the jihadist organizations, foremost among them al-Qaeda—may God give it glory—had to attack al-Raqqa, but in the manner of quick operations and street warfare with light weapons.

The regime relies on Daesh for bits and pieces. It is, after all, the one that gets it out of the crises. The convoy that was going to liberate the Aleppo prison was subjected to three booby-traps, as well as the shelling of those besieging the 17th Division in al-Raqqa. Additionally, the transfer of the battle to al-Raqqa is no less important than the transfer of the battle to the coastal mountains for the Nusayris.

They are two faces of the same coin and their objective is to abort the jihad.

All the jihadist organizations must support the mujahideen of Deir Ezzor, and no one must say that my organization is not targeted. Every mujahid is a target of assassination for the security people of Daesh.