Before the account, first published in April 2014, by an ostensible Islamic State (ISIS) defector, “Abu Ahmad”, there was the Twitter account @WikiBaghdady, which released a lot of information in the same vein about the alleged impiousness of the jihadist organization. @WikiBaghdady’s testimony, as collected by Yousef Bin Tashfin, is republished below, with some editions for transliteration and syntax, to ensure its preservation.
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Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a real person who has a fake nickname and title. This is also the case with everyone around him and there isn’t a member of Al-Baghdadi’s inner circle with a real name. Every person in Al-Baghdadi’s inner circle is 100% Iraqi and he doesn’t accept any other nationality because he does not trust anyone. The number of members in the Al-Baghdadi’s military council is about 8 to 13 people. The Military Council is headed by three people from Saddam’s army who also belonged to the former Ba’ath Party. The main leader is Brigadier General Haji Bakr who was previously an officer in Saddam’s Ba’athist army. Who exactly is Haji Bakr?! What is his relationship to Al-Baghdadi and when did it start?
Tweets on 14 December 2013
As mentioned previously, the Military Council is headed by three people from Saddam’s army who also belonged to the former Ba’ath Party. The main leader is Brigadier General Haji Bakr who was previously an officer in Saddam’s Ba’athist army. General Haji Bakr first met Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi when he offered his services to him due to having experience in Saddam’s Ba’athist army. He demonstrated his dedication to him and he is now considered to be one of the closest to him. However, Haji Bakr didn’t have any previous jihadi experience before that. He was accepted to the Military Council on the one condition of providing the State [AQI / ISI] with important information about the Iraqi army. When he did that and proved his loyalty, he was then appointed as the military adviser to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir and continuously provided them with information about previous military leaders, plans and successfully linking them with previous members of the Ba’ath Party. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi at this time was a member of AQI/ISI but outside the organization’s leadership. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s main residence was in western Iraq ,specifically in Anbar province and Fallujah. Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs were targeted with a bomb shell and they both died but Colonel Haji Bakr wasn’t among those who were hurt. A friend of Colonel Haji Bakr, who is named Mazen, frequently visited Haji Bakr before and after the death of Abu Omar and Abu Hafs.
Abu Hamza Muhajir has two other nicknames before joining AQI/ISI and they are Abu Ayyub and Abu Hafs.
Tweets on 15 December 2013
Haji Bakr offered Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi leadership in a private meeting a couple of hours before Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi died. Abu Bakr went through with the decision even though he was worried that he wouldn’t be able to handle all this responsibility. When Haji Bakr became a leader, a new era started that was important to Iraq as well where the amount of fear between citizens increased. A lot of people considered Haji Bakr to be arrogant next to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who many considered to be a quiet personality. In addition, Haji Bakr completely changed the way he looked where he shaved his beard off and even changed the way he speaks in the first few weeks. The main issue here is that no one in the State dared to question anything taking place because questioning was considered not trusting the other person. This issue was serious to a point where it was allowed to kill another member who considered being suspicious of another.
Haji Bakr then started holding private meetings with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to reshape the State. The first agreement was protecting the State from the inside and out. This involved creating a security outlet that would be able to respond to any type of danger. An important step that took place was that Haji Bakr prevented Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi from meeting with leaders from other groups so they didn’t impact or advise him in any way. The orders came from the Shura council that Abu Bakr created to ensure that all decisions made were fair. After this, the two became very close and were always with each other where many considered him to be Al-Baghdadi’s private minister.
Among their plans were various assassinations that in fact took place. This first started with twenty people and within a month, the number increased to one hundred people. It is essential to understand that no one in the State AQI/ISI would dare to take any orders from anyone else but Haji Bakr or Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi during that time. Every member in the Shura was carefully chosen by Haji Bakr and most of them were in the previous Ba’ath party. One of the members’ main responsibilities was assassinating everyone who disobeys or betrays the State. The assassinations also included leaders from other groups and judges.
In order to organize the orders and assassinations, Haji Bakr appointed someone that he really trusted who was a previous officer named Abu Safwan Rifaii. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi started feeling more comfortable and was very grateful to Haji Bakr. There were also several important decisions that took place:-
1) Collecting funds from the Shia, Christians, and other minorities.
2) Gaining control over the oil fields and energy sources and any governmental monetary funds.
3) Any company that got a contract from the Maliki government should be controlled whether it is a cleaning, maintenance, or even energy drills. If the owner of the company doesn’t agree, then he/she should be threatened to be killed or to destroy the company. This is also the case if the owner refuses to pay the required monthly taxes.
4) Placing checkpoints on the road to gain money from commercial trucks and vans. The amounts reached to $200 sometimes.
At this point, the State started gaining a lot of money and this led to an increase in the salaries and funds available to carry out military operations. This also led to more people wanting to join the State especially when they found out how much some members were getting paid. There are some important questions that have to be taken into consideration. How did the idea of creating the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS] occur? Who convinced Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to enter Syria three weeks before the creation of ISIS? Why was the announcement that ISIS had been created made quickly? Why did Abu Bakr al Baghdadi choose the Turkish borders to live before the announcement? How did he threaten Abu Mohammed Al-Jawlani before this all started?
There was a picture that was taken for Al-Baghdadi at the Turkish borders before the announcement of ISIS was made.
Tweets on 17 December 2013
When the Syrian revolution started, the State’s attention was focused from Iraq to Syria. Haji Bakr was worried that that many members were going to go to Syria without permission. This caused numerous problems in the council especially considering that many members who weren’t satisfied with certain aspects of the State wanted to go to Syria to escape everything. Haji Bakr recommended Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to inform all members that they shouldn’t even think about going to Syria and that any person who does is considered to be an outsider. The main reason was because the situation in Syria was uncertain and he wanted to be patient. However, the situation was getting worse with members of the state and it was clear some were going to leave to go to Syria. This is when Haji Bakr came up with the idea to send a group of non-Iraqi members to go to Syria with a Syrian leader. It was forbidden for any Iraqi leader to go and the point of this was to protect Iraqi members in the State, which were the majority. The leader in Syria was responsible for finding new members and this happened and the group became known as al-Nusra Front. Al-Nusra started growing with the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani and he became even more popular. Fighters from the Gulf, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Europe began joining Jabhat al-Nusra. This scared Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi because members of Jabhat al-Nusra didn’t have any loyalty towards him. This is when Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi sent a message to al-Jolani and informed him that he should publicly announce Jabhat al-Nusra belonged to the State. However, al-Jolani didn’t agree and sent a message a couple of days later saying that this would not be beneficial to the Syrian revolution. Haji Bakr decided to send spies to watch every move of al-Jolani. Haji Bakr also sent ten Iraqi members there but what is very surprising is that most of these members later stated their approval of what al-Jolani was doing. Al-Baghdadi then decided to look for accommodation in a safe place in Syria near the Turkish borders. No one knew about this except him, Haji Bakr, and three other members in the State.
What did al-Baghdadi do after entering Syria and where was his place of residence? Where exactly was he before the declaration of the ISIS?!
What did they do before the declaration? Did al-Baghdadi meet with al-Jolani before the declaration?!
Tweets on 18 December 2013
When did Al-Baghdadi enter Syria? Where did he live? Who did he meet? What is the relationship with Saudi officer Bandar Shaalan with the creation of the ISIS?
Al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr, and their companions entered Syria three weeks Jabhat al-Nusra was dissolved, staying at their residence on the Turkish borders. The arrangement made for Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi included a portable steel room in a place that isn’t fair from the Syrian Refugee camp because he considered that to be safer for them. The plan was to stay in the accommodation while Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi met with members and leaders from Jabhat al-Nusra and make them feel like he was loyal to them. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi made sure not to show any hatred or difference in opinion with al-Jolani in an effort to satisfy everyone. Al-Baghdadi made the following meeting plans:-
1) Meet with senior leaders from Jabhat al-Nusra face to face and introducing himself to them.
2) Not meeting any younger or unknown leaders but meeting instead with ten senior leaders.
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s plan was also to try to convince them that his main goal there was unity and defeating enemies. al-Jolani was mainly quiet throughout this phase and he didn’t attend any meetings and didn’t show any indifference or dislike towards Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. However, there still was worry among senior leaders about Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s real intentions. al-Jolani then found out that Al-Baghdadi was angry with him and there was possibility that he was going to be assassinated. This is when al-Jolani decided not to attend any of the meetings and there was continuous protection around him. Al-Baghdadi sent a message to al-Jolani informing him that Jabhat al-Nusra would soon be dissolved and it would be better if al-Jolani made the public announcement himself. However, al-Jolani didn’t respond as expected and sent back a letter saying that the decision to unite the State and al-Nusra was a huge mistake that would destroy the popularity al-Nusra built . Also, he explained that there is no way that the Syrian public would agree and that the best thing to do is for the State to back Iraq and letting Jabhat al-Nusra handle things in Syria. This is when Haji Bakr advised him to cancel the announcement and wait until a fighting group was created. Haji Bakr met with several members from Jabhat al-Nusra who weren’t satisfied with al-Jolani and asked to prepare fighters. Within three days, about 100,000 fighters were prepared and they were told of everything related to the announcement and when it was going to be made. During the time the announcement was being written al-Jolani was informed that he had to accept what was going to happen sooner and later. Also during this time Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi met with senior leaders from Jabhat al-Nusra as was planned in the beginning. Three days after the announcement was made, there were three main divisions and that included members joining Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, members staying neutral, and the remaining members staying loyal to al-Jolani. Al-Baghdadi then sent a message to al-Jolani and everyone that remained loyal to him that they could either change their loyalty or they were going to be killed. This is the same time where Bandar Al-Shaalan’s name started appearing. Bandar has had a great relationship with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi even before all of this took place. He was also the one to introduce Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to Al-Qahtani, who was in al-Jolani’s prisons previously.
What happened to al-Jolani after that? What happened before al-Jolani announced Al-Zawahiri’s deal? What was Haji Bakr’s position on the Zawahiri deal? How was Al-Zawahiri rejected?
Tweets on 20 December 2013
Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi found out that al-Jolani had no intention to listen to them and let go of Al-Nusra Front and that it was possible that he was going to announce this in the media as well. This is when Haji Bakr told Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi that they had to create a security team as fast as possible with two main missions which were:-
1) Gaining control on all the warehouses of Jabhat al-Nusra that consist of weapons and security equipment. Anyone who didn’t agree to give up control of the warehouses should be killed instantly.
2) Creating an assassination team to kill all the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra, starting with al-Jolani and then the rest. The plan was to find out all their movements and then murder them using cars that have explosions in them. This also includes arresting or murdering anyone close to them or aware of important information about the State, such as Al-Muhajir.
The assassination team first placed explosives on Al-Muhajir’s car but the mission wasn’t successful. After that, Al-Muhajir disappeared in fear of his life. Haji Bakr then called for an urgent meeting and was extremely angry at the assassination team because of their failure and that this is going to hinder other missions. At the same time, al-Jolani refused to let go of Jabhat al-Nusra and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was worried that he was going to go to Al-Zawahiri to solve the problem. This is exactly what took place and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi gained support from three other people, one Saudi leader and two Syrian leaders( names can’t be mentioned). Al-Zawahiri asked for time to solve the problem and he sent a message to Al-Qaeda’s leader in Yemen, Nasser Al-Weheshi, to try to find a solution. Al-Weheshi sent a message to Al-Baghadi and al-Jolani but Al-Baghdadi didn’t bother replying back. However, al-Jolani did reply back and justified his decision with the same reasons, and that this is going to hurt the Syrian revolution. Al-Weheshi then informed Al-Baghdadi that he can’t reach a solution and that he needs to find one himself. During that time, Al-Baghdadi continued with his plan but he changed the assassination strategy of him team from explosive cars to hiring professional snipers who started looking for Jabhat al-Nusra leaders immediately. Also, Haji Bakr asked Al-Qahtani to ask religious leaders from Saudi Arabia about their opinion on the whole thing and that what they say is going to be implemented?
How were religious leaders appointed in the ISIS? Who are they and what’s their job? Who were the main leaders and were they in the Gulf or in Syria?
Tweets on 24 December 2013
After Al-Baghdadi failed in eliminating Jabhat al-Nusra and the latter were becoming stronger, he and everyone around him became frustrated and felt like they need to go back to Iraq. However, two people told him to stay and they were Haji Bakr who completely refused everything Al-Zawahiri said and Al-Qahtani. Al-Qahtani also informed him that there is no way that he can return back to Jabhat al-Nusra especially because he not wanted there anymore. Al-Qahtani was also responsible during that period for bringing religious leaders from Saudi Arabia, especially the ones who truly cared about helping Syria and are against Al-Zawahiri. The thing is Al-Baghdadi himself didn’t truly want to leave Syria because he felt like he was freer in it and had more followers there. Al-Qahtani was focusing on two main approaches which were:-
1) Finding fighters who had a previous relationship or worked with the Gulf.
2) Creating a team responsible for the internet and media.
Al-Qahtani called Saudi religious leaders and fighters so they can admit their approval of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi but none of them had to be responsible to him. Also, he contacted Al-Shaalan so he can be the leader of the group in Saudi Arabia and trying to convince other religious leaders to support Al-Baghdadi. Even though he was able to appoint some religious leaders, he wasn’t able to appoint as many as ISIS expected. Al-Baghdadi was assertive on keeping Al-Qahtani around because he was from Saudi Arabia, even though he didn’t trust him that much. However, he considered him to be an advantage in attracting supporters from the Gulf region. The team responsible for the media and the internet were also going their job by promoting ISIS online and trying to shed a positive light on them as much as possible.
How was the media and internet team organized and who was their leader? How did they put their plan? Which religious leader told them they can lie to gain attention and followers?
Tweets on 27 December 2013
Al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr were completely convinced of the need for a media team with the responsibility of promoting and defending the ISIS. They also wanted the members to work 24/7 and agreed that the place where their reputation can be ruined the most is Saudi Arabia and this is where they should first start promoting the ISIS. Al-Qahtani recommended creating two media teams:-
1) The first one consisted of Saudi members from inside Syria.
2) The second one consisted of Saudis from inside of Saudi Arabia and the two teams were known as Ansar Al-mujahideen (the media branch).
Every team was appointed a leader and they were in fact working on a daily basis and they had accounts on every platform. Some of the main accounts were @almohajer8225, @a_alfaiz, @bmr8000, @K_L7, @abo_aleeth,@a_s_m2010. The two teams were closely working together all the time and were constantly posting news. Al-Qahtani then informed them that it was religiously okay to lie if this is going to help the ISIS because it is permissible to trick the enemy in a time of war. During that time, Haji Bakr was stressed out and felt that there were various divisions taking place and that the media teams of other opposing groups were ruining their reputation. They were even considering arresting Al-Qahtani due to him failure in improving their reputation in the media. When Mohammed Faris [a commander with Ahrar al Sham] was [mistakenly] murdered, this was considered to be a catastrophe and Haji Bakr was very angry and he ordered the assassinators to release a video denying that they are involved. However, they ended up rejecting their orders and told him that they were ordered by senior leaders in ISIS and that it wasn’t their fault because they were just following order. Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi met with Al-Qahtani again and told him that he needs to do anything to stop this attack on them and the campaign by religion leaders on them. This is when Al-Qahtani informed them that it is obvious that the team he created wasn’t as effective as he thought but that he couldn’t find any influential religious leaders to endorse him. This was the time when Al-Qahtani started thinking about other options.
How did Al-Qahtani start his projects to protect ISIS? How did he place the rumor and defamation project? How did he create a team that records everything religious leaders say privately and then blackmail them? Who did he hire for the spying and recording process and what did he do with the recordings? What did Al-Baghdadi think about the progress?
Tweets on 29 December 2013
Haji Bakr informed al Baghdadi that two new projects were going to be launched and they were:-
1) The recording projects on anyone who opposes them especially from other groups and that they were going to be blackmailed later on.
2) The spying project on senior leaders and some members of ISIS that they were suspicious about.
Both these projects were very important and sensitive because the right people had to be appointment and in total secrecy. Also, they were responsible for sending these recording to Al-Baghdadi and this is why choosing them was a very difficult process. Al-Qahtani informed Al-Baghdadi that he was planning on pretending like someone else to call the Saudi Sheikh Sulemain Al-Elwan so he can get him to speak about support Al-Baghdadi, even if it was only a compliment. The phone call did actually take place and lasted for sixteen minutes but it was mainly complimentary. However, they did get what they wanted and considered it to be important evidence and that they can replace Al-Qahtani’s voice with Al-Baghdadi’s voice very easily. The spying and recording team mainly consisted of four Saudis who sent all the recordings to Al-Baghdadi. This was also the time where the Muslim Brotherhood was taking control in Egypt and Al-Baghdadi informed everyone that they should start quiet and not comment on the situation at all. Haji Bakr recommended releasing Al-Elwan’s recordings so they can strengthen their position or to reach a deal with al Elwan so he can support them or stay quiet. Al-Baghdadi was also hoping to gain recordings on senior leaders of groups in Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. However, this was quite difficult to do because they didn’t have their own religious support and used easy to track communication tools.
Did Al-Qahtani come up with another plan? Who are the media team leaders that he trusted? Who are the religious leaders?
Tweets on 30 December 2013
What is the real name of al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS? Is it Baghdadi? Is it Doctor? Is his surname correct?! Is it Qureshi [descended from the Prophet and therefore eligible to be a Caliph]?! The question is continuously repeated.
His first name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim and he was also known as Abu Awad. As a nickname, he was called Abu Bakr. The surname Baghdadi is not real. He first lived in Al-Samarra but then moved to Fallujah to work as an imam of the mosque Diyala. He doesn’t have a Ph.D as claimed and he never worked as a medical doctor anywhere. However, the last statement has not been 100% confirmed until now.
Tweets on 31 December 2013
Al-Qahtani had another plan in mind and it was mainly revolved around defeating any opposing parties of Al-Baghdadi in any way possible. Al-Qahtani formed a secret group for this mission especially that those who opposed Al-Baghdadi were significantly increasing in number. He created two teams again and the first team consisted of two people who were Hamoud al-Matiri and Aliwi al-Shamri. The two were chosen based on their knowledge about the internet and their previous time in jail due to supporting Al-Baghdadi. They were informed that they had to operate with fake names and look for religious evidence that supports Al-Baghdadi. Also, they were informed that they had the responsibility of responding to anyone who says anything negative about ISIS and to be continuously active online. Another important member of the team was Abdallah Al-Faiz (@a_alfaiz), who operated his personal account and was responsible for other accounts at the same time as well. The teams mainly operated by responding to opposing individuals and parties by verses from the Quran or claiming that their opponents were working with the government. The main point here was to ruin the reputation of the opposing parties in any way, even if this involves using Quran verses in ways that aren’t suitable or even true. Al-Qahtani also asked Al-Sebaii from Saudi Arabia (@ntfooosh) to use his account to attack anyone opposing al Baghdadi especially since he had a large amount of followers. However, he replied back by informing him that he can’t do it because his father disagreed and this is when Al-Qahtani approached Abu al-Walid (@AbuAlwalidMhajr) to convince him but his father didn’t agree either. They even tried convincing them by telling him that it is allowed to disobey your father to support Al-Baghdadi but he still refused. During that time, it was apparent that four main opposing sheikhs had a huge influence and they were Abd el Aziz Tarifi, Sulieman Al-Elwan, Youusef El Maghrabi, and Amr Hadoushi. This is when ISIS met and asserted the importance of getting rid of the four in any way possible involving completely ruining their reputation.
What did Al-Baghdadi do after divisions started taking place inside Iraq? What did Haji Bakr tell Qahtani to insult him? What are the steps that Haji Bakr took to try to prevent these divisions and did he take the passports of certain members?
Tweets on 1 January 2014
The ISIS was obviously facing numerous problems where the soldiers themselves were starting to speak about divisions. It was also obvious that Al-Qahtani’s plans were failing and nothing was working anymore. During that time, Haji Bakr decided to spy on al Shishani and ordered Al-Muhajir (@AbuAlwalidMhajr) to do so. The latter informed Al-Shishani that he was a religious personality and that he needed to speak to him. After a couple of conversations, Al-Shishani became comfortable and informed Al-Muhajir that he is seriously considering leaving ISIS. Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi called a meeting with Al-Qahtani and Haji Bakr screamed at him and told him: there are serious divisions taking place and you’re sleeping! This is when Al-Qahtani called several people close to Al-Shishani to try to convince him to stay. However, Al-Muhajir contacted them several days later and told them that al Shishani was not convinced and that there was a strong possibility that he was going to leave soon. This made them even angrier and he informed Al-Qahtani that he is going to do to him what al-Jolani did to him in prison and that ISIS doesn’t respect anyone who doesn’t work enough for its survival. Al-Qahtani sent another Saudi personality Abo Ali al-Najdi (@aboalialsultanto) informed Al-Shishani that he would be killed even if he considered leaving. Al-Shishani became really scared and began informing everyone around him that he wasn’t planning on leaving and Haji Bakr ordered him to release an official statement saying so. Al-Shishani was very hesitant and even went through with his withdrawal decision from ISIS along with 800 other fighters. When Haji Bakr saw the extent of the withdrawal, he knew it was impossible to kill everyone and this was considered to be the worst catastrophe ever and the ISIS tried to keep it away from the media. Al-Baghdadi even became more scared and they both agreed that they should hire Iraqi spies in Syria and Iraq to inform them if everyone is planning on leaving them. They also agreed on threatening the soldiers and taking any communication tools from them.
Are there any spies inside opposing groups and who were they? What did Al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr do when they found out about the possibility of creating an Islamic caliphate? What are the plans to destroy the Islamic caliphate project? Who killed Abd El Kader Salah and what does that have to do with Abu al-Atheer?
Tweets on 5 January 2014
Haji Bakr started placing spies in the groups that they were worried about the most and even attempted to brag to soldiers who worked for them. They were more concerned with the ‘’Liberate Syria’’ group because they were the strongest rebel group. Even though they placed numerous spies, they were unable to reach to the leaders and the news was reaching them very late. Haji Bakr was hoping to get the news fast so he can confuse the groups and ruin their reputation quickly. Haji Bakr still tried to look for a spy from inside and he was successful in hiring a colonel who worked for them as a spy. He provided them with information about their strengths and the weakness. The most dangerous information that came to them was the possibility of ‘’Liberate Syria’’ joining with other groups such as Liwa Al-Tawheed and Ahrar Al-Sham. Surprisingly, they decided to take the media approach again and ruin the reputation of some of these groups so they don’t consider joining together. Al-Firas Al-Absi was among the first to announce his group in Syria and its name was Al-Shura council for an Islamic caliphate. The number of members in it was 180 people. However, he was later on killed on the Turkish borders and the Al-Qaeda flagged was closed which resulted in the border closing. During that time, Al-Elwan refused to support anything until he meets with a senior leader of any of the groups. This is when Al-Atheer’s brother met with him and he told him that he refuses calling it a caliphate and that it should be called a group instead. However, a huge fight took place between them when he rejected and this led to Al-Atheer calling him a traitor.
At the same time, an announcement was made about the formation of a group called the ‘’Islamic Front’’. Later on, it was found that the group consisted of several groups such as Liberate Syria, Islamic army, Ahrar al Sham, and Al-Tawheed. The ISIS felt like they were in serious danger and decided to increase their presence in Iraq and Syria. Amro Al-Absi recommended that Al-Baghdadi asks for support from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt. However, most of the group members there rejected them and everyone felt frustrated. Al-Atheer was also worried about what taking place especially that a large group in Aleppo ( Liwa Al-Tawhid) were gaining more control with 20,000 fighters. They were five times more in number than that of ISIS.
Who is Abu Ayman, a member of ISIS?
What is the responsibility of Othamn from Saudi Arabia?
Did al Baghdadi consider going back to Iraq and why?
Tweets on 8 January 2014
Al-Baghdadi informed Al-Atheer that he should execute everyone in the prisons in Aleppo and not leave any single person alive. This was the same time that Al-Baghdadi considered going back to Iraq because he was worried that something bad is going to happen. However, three people tried convincing him not to do so and they were Haji Bakr, Abu Ali Al-Anbari, and finally Abu Ayman who was a senior leader in ISIS. Haji Bakr, who was killed recently, informed him that it is even more dangerous to go back to Iraq and this is going to cause even more divisions. Al-Anbari asked Othman Nazih to speak to the soldiers and inform them about the importance of fighting for ISIS and dying for it. Al-Anbari also gave him the responsibility of motivating them and speaking to them whenever something serious is taking place and continuously informing them about the important of staying loyal to ISIS. There were concerns that Al-Anbari has hired a spy inside ISIS and this is one of the dangerous rumours taking place. Amr Al-Eissa, a member of ISIS, gave him a list of people who should be executed in the Free Syria Army and in the Islamic Front.
How was it planned to kill the leader of Free Syria Army?
Did Al-Baghdadi consider carrying out plans outside of Syria and where?
Tweets on 12 January 2014
The leader of the Iraqi group is Daesh Abu Awad. Al-Baghdadi was meeting several times with the leaders of the group and this was considered to be the worst times for them. They have lost a large number of men and Al-Baghdadi asked two days before that for the statistics of those following him which were only 1,757 mostly from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Algeria. He also found out that most fighters who left him would go to Jabhat al-Nusra and he asked to do everything they can whether it is by media, religious methods, or finding more fighters to increase his strength. He also asked Al-Qahtani to protect any religious sayings made from any Sheikh who would oppose him. Al-Qahtani was the most excited for this and he even changed his name to Abu Bakr. Al-Qahtani called Al-Faiz and informed him that he should increase his media presence again and do everything he can to save ISIS. Faiiz was also loyal to him where he was originally fighting in Iraq and then illegally entered Saudi Arabia and then jailed after he was shot in the leg. Faiiz informed them that he going to do everything he can and provide them with important information and that they should trust him. He also appointed other members who were Abd al-Rahman Sultan, Rayan Abu Hamid, Adnan Al-Shaalan, and Tamiim Al-Qaadi. Al-Baghdadi also informed Al-Anbari to stop fighting against Bashar Al-Asad’s forces and focus on fighting those who don’t support him, especially from Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic Front. He also made two important decisions during that time.
1) There is no way that he is going to be able to defeat them without suicide bombers.
2) An explosive operation has to take place in Turkey so he can cut down the Turkish and Western support.
He strongly believed that there is no way that he was going to be able to defeat opposing parties without these two important decisions.
Tweets on 19 January 2014
There were about twenty to thirty fighters who split from the ISIS on a daily basis. They found that fighters from Saudi Arabia were the most likely to split and that Tunisians were the least. This is when he ordered that the suicide bombers should be Saudi as much as possible, and that Tunisians shouldn’t be involved since they’re the most loyal. He also tried gaining more fighters but wasn’t successful at all. He appointed Abu Jaafar from Tunisia as a senior and asked him to try to bring fighters from Tunisia, Libya, Turkey, and Egypt and he should do this without the governments of these countries finding out. Abu Jaafar also tried appointing fighters from opposing groups in Syria and even offered them $1500 to join them. However, this didn’t work at all but they were only successful in hiring Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi from Jordan which wasn’t his original name but was changed by Al-Baghdadi so he can sound more important and religious. He provided Al-Baghdadi with a lot of important information but he was still angry at other members of ISIS because they weren’t doing anything to stop the divisions. He was also interested in appointing two Saudi personalities and they were Abu Al-Zubair and Adel Al-Murshadi and he informed them that they should start supporting ISIS publicly. Abu Zubair is a previous fighter in several countries and knows numerous senior leaders but he refused to make any public announcement and decided to only help him in finding fighters. Abu Zubair also called numerous groups in the gulf, especially the Green council which is led by Abu Nasser Al-Shamri, and informed them that they should join Al-Baghdadi. However, they refused and informed them that they aren’t going to join him unless Sheiks Al-Elwan and Al-Tarifi tell them to do so. Abu Zubair then tried to contact another group which is Al-Ezz eagles which consisted of mainly Saudis but they rejected as well. It was obvious to Al-Baghdadi that he doesn’t have a lot of supporters anymore. Al-Baghdadi then appointed Al-Murshidi to speak to the Sheikhs to support ISIS or at least remain quiet about where they stand. From the people he spoke to where Aliwi Al-Shamri. Another person was Hammad Al-Rayes but he refused to publicly announce his support because he claimed that he was scared from the government of Saudi Arabia and that he will only provide a fatwa. Al-Rayes also informed them that his support is obvious if he sent his leaders to Al-Baghdadi. However, there was news reaching Al-Baghdadi that he is calling his sons and telling to leave al Baghdadi without any notice because it isn’t safe from them. When Al-Baghdadi spoke to the sons, they informed him that this is completely not true and there are no plans that they were going to leave.
Tweets on 24 January 2014
Based on what was said previously about Amr Al-Absi from Syria, and his thoughts and his mentality, he controls the ISIS’s jails and is responsible for murdering and torturing prisoners. A few months ago, Al-Qahtani was seduced to marry several Syrians who were Al-Absi’s relatives as well http://youtu.be/guJp-4EUxx0. Al-Qahtani was also completely supportive of the way Al-Absi treated and tortured prisoners.
UPDATE: Further details about Amr al-Absi (Abu al-Atheer al-Absi) from WikiBaghdady:
Amr al-Absi especially sought to penetrate Ahrar al-Sham, which was the most threatening group to al-Dawla’s project in Syria. He failed to get near their leadership; his intelligence was too late and often distorted because it was given by low-ranking soldiers.
Al-Absi and al-Baghdadi were very eager to destroy Ahrar al-Sham. Al-Absi began screenings for the most dangerous individual that could infiltrate Ahrar, and eventually succeeded through a leader of a brigade that followed Ahrar. This leader have Haji Bakr important intelligence on Ahrar’s weaknesses, which was used to make Dawla stronger.
The most crucial intelligence to reach al-Absi was of the proposed union between Ahrar and other factions like Liwa al-Islam [Jaysh al-Islam, as of September 2013], Liwa al-Tawhid, and Suqur al-Sham. This news came as a big shock. Haji Bakr called for an urgent meeting of the leaders of Dawla.
Al-Baghdadi, al-Anbari, Abu bakr al-Qahtani, Amr al-Absi, and others agreed on a two-track solution.
First track: a media campaign to break the initiative—calling it Sahwati, intelligence-run—and thereby obstruct it. A powerful media initiative took place to distort the plan through the internet, to sow rumours, and to exaggerate.
Second track: inflate the project of al-Dawla to a Caliphate, an idea proposed by Amr al-Absi, also known as Abu al-Atheer al-Shami, the wali of Aleppo.
Al-Absi has a dead brother called Firas al-Absi, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Shami, born in 1973 in Jedda [Saudi Arabia], a dentist. The two brothers were serious takfirists. Abu al-Atheer was imprisoned in Sednaya in Syria. He made takfir on all the thousands of Salafis he was imprisoned with, except his brother and a handful of others who shared his manhaj [methodology].
Firas was the first to call his group “a state” in Syria [al-Majlis Shura Dawlat al-Islam (MSDI)]. There were 180 [fighters] in his group, which was known as Dawla. Firas was killed at Bab al-Hawa crossing, where he raised the flag of al-Qaeda at the Turkish border [in July 2012]. This caused the closing of most access to Turkey from Syria. The reformers of Syria were horrified by the flag. People tried to convince him to take it down, but he wouldn’t. Firas was killed by an anonymous group and the flag was taken down and the border was reconquered [by the rebels]. Fingers were pointed at people [by Amr al-Absi].
The first: Abu Sayih Usama Junaid Kharij Huquq from Tal Shur. The second: Hamza al-Shamali Abu Hisham, a drug dealer from Kafr Aya near Bab Amru.
The place of Firas’ death was under the control of Kataib al-Faruq and Ahrar, so Abu al-Atheer held a strong grudge against these brigades, whom he blamed for Firas’ death. He viewed these groups as, at the very least, complicit or silent over the death.
Al-Absi became emir of MSDI and work began in trying to strengthen it and multiply its ranks. He did: from 180 to 540 [fighters]. He began operations against the brigades he hated and began reaching out to al-Baghdadi in Iraq, before he came to Syria to plan a unified entity with al-Absi.
Not many know that the first branch for al-Baghdadi in Syria was al-Absi’s, but it was a secret and he—to the criticism of many—took the word “Dawla” out of his group’s name. Al-Absi’s group was first called al-Majlis Shura Dawlat al-Islam, but then “Dawlat al-Islam” was deleted and replaced with “al-Mujahideen” [i.e. al-Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen or Mujahideen Shura Council]. This was long before al-Baghdadi came from Iraq, when al-Absi was trying to strengthen his group’s relations with al-Baghdadi, in case he came to Syria.
Al-Absi looked for Saudi supporters from his former links, because his father was an old-timer in Saudi Arabia.
Al-Absi’s reputation at this time was as a takfiri, and his brother’s death—the inner despair it cause—was seen as the reason for his leaving the Syrian fighters for this group, and the distortedness of his manhaj.
Al-Absi began to try to win support from abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia. He did this by sending a delegation made up of four people. This delegation, led by himself, went to Saudi sheikhs to get support for his plan.
The most prominent [sheikhs al-Absi visited] included: Sulayman al-Alwan, Abdalaziz al-Turayfi, Abdurrahman al-Barak, and Aabdallah al-Ghaniman.
Abu al-Atheer’s proposal was rejected by al-Alwan. Al-Alwan refused to support [al-Absi] until there was support from well-known [jihadi] ideologues. Al-Absi then met al-Turayfi, who expressed his opposition to the term “al-Dawla”. Al-Turayfi stipulated that consensus was needed from the mujahideen for a state and he refused to listen. It is said al-Absi was expelled [from al-Turayfi’s presence]. Meanwhile, al-Barak and al-Ghaniman apologized for the reception and lack of audience.
Al-Absi continued to build his relationship with al-Baghdadi, and he corresponded with him, urging him to come to Syria and join him in his fight against other [insurgent] groups.
Al-Absi’s brother’s spilt blood, the blood of the former leader of the group, was never forgotten, nor was the idea of revenge against his other enemies.
When al-Baghdadi came to Syria, al-Absi was one of the first people to meet him and privately pledge allegiance to him. This became public later.
Revenge was still al-Absi’s greatest concern. Al-Absi was always waiting for the perfect opportunity to get revenge, and always speaking about his grief at his brother’s death with Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi.
When the Islamic Front was announced [in November 2013]—including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqur al-Sham, and Liwa al-Tawhid—al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr, and al-Absi sensed danger and it was proposed, as it was before, to announce a caliphate.
The idea [for a caliphate] was supported, but how does one go about doing this? Al-Absi proposed that al-Baghdadi ask for bay’at (pledges of allegiance) from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Sinai. Al-Baghdadi sent a delegation to call for the influential ideologues in these states to support al-Baghdadi. The idea was that al-Baghdadi would receive bay’at on tape from these places an then the videos would be released simultaneously when the caliphate was announced. It would be as if the pledges came in from everywhere, answering al-Baghdadi’s call. Al-Baghdadi called upon the influential [foreign] members of al-Dawla to call for bay’at from their states.
Al-Baghdadi consulted with [the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir] al-Wuhayshi, who rejected the idea. It was also rejected in Afghanistan and Morocco. Al-Baghdadi did receive bay’at from anonymous jihadists in Sinai, Tunisia, and Libya. The tapes were disappointing.
Al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr, and al-Absi were frustrated. Abu Bakr al-Qahtani requested the support of Saudi scholars for the [caliphate] idea and told them that its announcement was nearing. But it failed and they gave up on it. Al-Absi was angry because his opportunity for revenge was taken [away].
Al-Baghdadi made al-Absi wali of Aleppo as reward for his loyalty and quick allegiance.
Al-Absi had been concerned by the biggest group in Aleppo, Liwa al-Tawhid. The number of fighters in Liwa al-Tawhid neared 20,000, compared to Dawla’s 5,000 [in the Aleppo area]. Al-Absi felt Liwa al-Tawhid was a big obstacle to the expansion of al-Dawla. It’s leader, Abdulqadir al-Saleh [a.k.a. Haji Marea] was very popular with the people of Aleppo. After Liwa al-Tawhid joined the Islamic Front, al-Absi was even more worried.
Al-Absi knew of the formation of the Islamic Front and the inclusion of Liwa al-Tawhid before it was announced [because ISIS had a spy in the meetings]. Al-Absi wanted rid of al-Saleh, whom he thought of as an apostate and a Sahwi, and because he formed a big problem for al-Absi and al-Dawla in Aleppo. The details by which al-Absi wanted to dispose of the leader fo Liwa al-Tawhid were not known, however the news of al-Saleh’s death eventually came.
UPDATE 2: On 13 November 2016, a collaborative effort on JustPasteIt added the following records from WikiBaghdady
Tweets on 24 January 2014
In confirmation of what we explained previously, Amr al-Absi Abu al-Atheer, the Syrian, and his thoughts and his mentality, he controls IS jails and is responsible for the killing of prisoners in Aleppo.
The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani is doing the role of giving the advisory opinion and judgments of murder and torture with electricity and suspending sentences as we have explained in this confession. http://t.co/6sX66btuxqA few months ago there was information that the Saudi al-Qahtani may marry several Syrian, some of them relatives of the Syrian Abu al-Atheer, as he came to Syria single and unmarried.
The decisions of the young Saudi al-Qahtani started with the matters related to prison and deciding about torturing with electric shock, suspending and execution after viewing the conditions of the investigation.
Talking about these details soon.
Tweets on 17 January 2014
We confirmed for you the killing of Iraqi Colonel Haji Bakr before the announcement this month. The concealment of the news about his death was a desire of al-Baghdadi until the release of the dead Colonel’s picture.
Haji Bakr was the most dangerous figure in IS and he greatly influenced al-Baghdadi, because Hajii Bakr gave to al-Baghdadi the Emirate of IS and was his right hand. Now the shadow government for IS has changed:
- The place of the Colonel has been taken by the Iraqi Abu Ali al-Anbari. He is a 50yr old violent Iraqi who entered into a position of influence in the Baghdadi State.
- Two old Ba’athist officers have come to a leadership position and are working in the shadows. They are Major General Mohammed al-Douiri and Major General Saeed Mohammed al-Dgyeman.
All of this is an evidence of the large changes incoming in the politics of IS and al-Baghdadi. The new officers are not affected by religion, so the religious turbulence during this period didn’t affect them as it did for example with the departures of the Iraqis after the killing of Haji Bakr, when they lost faith in the current leadership and were afraid of the future of IS, which lead to them leaving after the Fatwa of the Saudi sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, which caused the desertion of approximately 30% of IS troops, as the fatwa forbade the affiliation to al-Baghdadi.
There was a large campaign to compensate for the loss and to maintain the remaining fighters but there came explosions, bombs and /video clips of the Saudi cleric Dr. al-Muhaysini which disrupted the movements to compensate for the loss fighters. All of these increased the withdrawals on a large scale, and the Baghdadi State’s leadership became angry, which make Baghdadi approve without any feeling the dangerous offer from Amr al-Absi, this is, to implement bomb attacks and suicide missions against “awakening” groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front.
Al-Baghdadi ordered to stop the attacks against the Syrian Regime, focusing the attack on the other two groups. Al-Baghdadi consulted Abu Ali al-Anbari about the bomb and suicide attack operations, and al-Anbari told him that the use of the fighters in martyrdom operations against awakening groups was better than this fighters deserting them, and due to the remaining crisis, al-Anbari ordered the Emirs of IS to emphasize the supervision of the soldiers and the security of what was being played in the media, and to emphasize the use of guards in the fighter groups, so that no one of them should leave alone unless it was to carry out a suicide attack or under intense supervision. […] The departure without permission is considered a departure from obedience, and IS has the right to kill them immediately for that crime.
This order minimized the splitting of the state and the desertion of the soldiers, but complaints arrived to al-Baghdadi from Abu Bakr al-Qahtani, explaining that there is a campaign of arrests in Saudi Arabia against IS supporters, which had lessened their media support and the popularity was at its lowest level. The jurist Hamoud al-Mutairi apologized to al-Qahtani, and the same did Abullah al-Fayez, Allioui al-Shammari and Abu al-Zubair. There was a state of fear to the Saudi government, and two influential Saudi figures of ISIS were arrested: Bandar al-Shaalan and Ryan Abu Himd.
Due to this problem, an alternative figure has appeared, and this is the Saudi Abdul Rahman Sultan, which took control of the administration of the Saudi Arabia media wing committee, where he supervises the accounts which attack Syrian rebels and Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front continuously. He supervises many accounts and feeds with information from Syria through al-Qahtani to intensify the media work and revive the slow death of the State of al-Baghdadi, and to distort enemies with influence over IS like al-Muhaysini. Now al-Anbari has suggested fighting influential leaders whether inside or outside Syria, and these are the three most dangerous figures for IS:
- Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, commander in Jabhat al-Nusra
- Hassan Aboud
- Abdullah al-Muhaysini, the Saudi cleric.
And during this period Amr al-Absi proposed to al-Anbari and al-Baghdadi to move the war to the Gulf and to target Saudi Arabia. To justify it, al-Absi said that all their previous support from the Saudis in terms of fighters and else has stopped due to the fatwas of their sheikhs, so there is no benefit to them in the security of Saudi Arabia, and they must move the war to confuse the enemy.
Tweets on 27 February 2014
The assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri [Muhammad al-Bahaya] was completed by a security force composed of three individuals who are:
- Abu Ali al-Anbari
- Amr al-Absi (Abu al-Atheer)
- Abu Asama al-Iraqi
Abu Asama’s mission was to recruit 5 people: 2 Libyan individuals and 3 Tunisian individuals under the supposed mission of assassinating Jamal Ma’arouf, and the 3 suicide bombers won’t know that they will target Abu Khalid al-Suri and if their mission doesn’t succeed behind them there will be 2 other individuals in a car that has 10 tons of explosives for storming the center and what is in it. The specific location of Abu Khalid al-Suri was known by al-Baghdadi through an Iraqi officer that is his friend, and the information came from the Iraqi and US intelligence because there is a table for the liquidation of jihadi leaders, including al-Jolani and al Hamwi.
A report was released by request of al-Baghdadi with the title [Stop with the Islamic Front], created by Abu Sa’d al-Najdi, who is a Saudi.
Ali al-Jabali led the leaders of IS to Turki al-Binali, which is the guy who releases reports supporting IS under the name of Hussam al-Majid.
Lastly, al-Baghdadi ordered the placement of all the wives of the immigrants/foreigners under surveillance to avoid dissidence amongst them and so that they can’t leave with their families.
Tweets on 14 March 2014
A Saudi who is associated with al-Baghdadi made a suggestion to the organization leaders to kill the Saudi cleric Abdullah al-Muhaysini and to take care of him. Al-Baghdadi agreed to this mission and created a team with him made up of several individuals and the group took off a few days ago and is now in Huraytan (Haritan, Syria).
The Saudi that proposed the assassination is from the same town/village as al-Muhaysini in Saudi Arabia.
Tweets on 1 April 2014
Islamic organizations usually rely on secrecy in their work in order to safeguard the lives of its members. This secrecy is the indispensable element of the integrity of the organization. This secrecy is reinforced by a security department in the organization, known as the Security Committee. This committee structures the organization and its administration. Those who control [this committee], control the organization, as said by Judge Abu Shuaib al-Masri in an audio recording after the half mark on the security [operatives] he met in Daesh [link from source] http://youtu.be/yHG0ji77u8Y
The security operatives are found in Daesh starting by the general command, and under the general supervisor (Abu Muslim al-Turkmani), to whom the Ba’athist Haji Bakr—formerly, he died—reported, and who has been succeeded now by Al-Anbari. The direct head of the Security Committee is Abu Ahmed al-Alwani, the mayor of Diyala. He was a lieutenant-colonel in the [military] intelligence of Saddam’s army and until now has got connections. Al-Alwani was held for a while in Iraq and was released like the rest of the Ba’athist prisoners, who fled when the American invaded. He remained a Ba’athist while in detention. After his detention ended, he was part of the choir that joined Daesh by recommendation from Haji Bakr and other Saddam’s Ba’athists. Given his experience, he was tasked with the Security Committee. He structured the organization in Iraq and later in the Levant [Syria] to cells and units, run by security operatives loyal to him and whose faces were never revealed and identities were never known. Like other Ba’ath officers, Al-Alwani had connections with the Ba’ath leadership in Syria before and after the revolution. He was leading the coordination with the [Syrian] regime. We have valuable evidence on the collaboration of Al-Alwani with the Syrian regime and the handover of nearly 100 Mujahedeens from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar at the beginning of the revolution. Initially, the Syrian regime relied on the likes of Al-Alwani to hand over the Mujahedeen before they multiplied [in numbers]. After they became so many, they deliberately let the Mujahedeen reach IS. The aim was to use them in fighting the Mujahedeen from other factions by controlling them through their collaborationist leaders such as Al-Alwani. The proof we have on the collaboration of IS will be presented to any faction which arrests and interrogates Al-Alwani.
Now we move to his [Alwani’s] deputy, the head of IS security in Aleppo Abu Ahmad Haa’ut. He is a Syrian officer and used to be in charge of [Syrian] State Security Intelligence in Aleppo. Before the revolution, he remained at his position for over two and a half years. Then he suddenly defected and fewer than 30 days later, he joined IS and swore allegiance after serving more than 25 years in the intelligence services of the Syrian Ba’ath [regime] and after the executions of Palmyra [prison], the rape in Aleppo, and the crackdown in the Levant [i.e. Damascus]. After two years and a half of the revolution’s start, he repented. After all of this record, and less than a month of his repentance, he joined IS and was assigned with a similar [security] role. It was the head of IS security in Aleppo. He committed massacres similar to his old days in the Ba’athist regime.
Abu Ahmad Haa’ut executed his nephew Nur—may the mercy of God be upon him—himself after torturing him and his friends for long. They were arrested only for saying that [Haa’ut] was with IS. Al-Haa’ut tortured and passed capital punishment verdicts against many of the Muslim youths, such as Dr. Abu Rayyan—whose bodies were found in a mass grave upon the withdrawal of IS. Haa’ut deliberately sought to create security incidents which caused major problems for IS, such as the leak of the infidelity [sic] of Muhammad Faris in the hospital [translator: an Ahrar al-Sham member who was reportedly beheaded by IS for being a Shia] even though this [charge] was a total lie as he did not do that.
The IS operatives now are playing the same role played by [Prophet Mohammed-era double-agent Abdullah] Bin Sabaa and his soldiers when Ali [Bin Abi Taleb] and Muwaiyah [Bin Abi Sufyan] mended their ties but [Bin Sabaa] fabricated a discord. We still have a lot on IS security operatives and about the real reason for the killing of Abi Sa’d al-Hadrami, the emir of Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Raqqa. We will publish that in due course.
Tweets on 4 April 2014
We’ll start our topic today about the killings that targeted the mujahidin of Ansar al-Islam in Iraq that were done by ISIS, as narrated by Abu Ahmad Al-Iraqi:
Sheikh Abu Al-Hareth Al-Uwaysi was a student of knowledge, a mujahid, a tribe leader and a caller to Allah (missionary). He was imprisoned by the Americans in the year of 2005 with the suspicion that he belonged to the Ansar Al-Islam. He left the prison in the year of 2010, and after that he—Sheikh Al-Uwyasi—got imprisoned by IS and after that he was killed and his body got disposed of. IS denied—like always—their responsibility of killing him, and after a while it was confirmed that they were indeed responsible and behind the killing of Sheikh Al-‘Uwaysi. IS admitted after that, that indeed they were behind his killing and they justified his killing by saying that the Sheikh was an apostate and that thereby it was obligated to kill him, and they didn’t mentioned the reasons for his apostasy.
Abu Huda was a student of knowledge, he had a doctorate in military science and he was very popular within the society/with the people. IS killed him and like the custom within the Batiniyah (shia sects) today, is that they denied the fact that they had some connection to his killing. After a while it was confirmed by Ansar Al-Islam that they (IS) were behind the killing of Shaihk Abu Huda. ISIS admitted it and they justified the killing by saying that he was an apostate and they didn’t mention –like always—the reasons of his apostasy. After that they killed Abu Mohammed Al-Uwaysi, the leader (Emir) of Ansar Al-Islam in Kirkuk, and they also denied the fact that they had a connection to his killing. After that they killed an Imam of a mosque who left working under Ansar al-Islam and he (the Imam) focused all his time on missionary work in the outskirts and IS killed him also.
And all these killings were the leaders and the sheikhs of Ansar al-Islam were killed, it was all done by the IS leadership of Mosul on that time, and his name is Abu Aqil Al-Iraqi. Abu Aqil al-Iraqi was an officer in the Ba’athist intelligence under the Sadam ruler ship of Iraq. And he was also the one who caused the most damage against Ansar al-Islam in the era of Saddam Hussein and also in the era of the Husaini the Quayshi!!! (he means Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). While the reality was that most of those whom were killed of Ansar al-Islam were pretty sympathetic towards the agenda of IS and they would think good of them, they (Ansar al-Islam) underestimated them because they would see them as brothers and mujahidin and so they became their (IS) sacrifices.
After this they (IS) started with security raids against the Ansar al-Islam to stop them from existing, they started with killing Salah Al-Ansari, the military Emir within Ansar al-Islam of Mosul and they killed many other brothers. After that, the Ba’athi Abu Aqil together with his criminal raid group within ISIS started to raid, kill and blowing up the houses of our brothers from Ansar al-Islam with their families in it, many of them were killed. And the worst of all that they’ve done is the following: They requested the soldiers of Ansar Al-Islam to fill in a personal information paper with the following information:
- The real name of the soldier.
- What group is affiliated to.
- The payments he gets.
- A declaration of aversion against Ansar Al-Islam
And after that he (the soldier) would stamp it with a stamp of aversion against Ansar al-Islam and they would stick a copy of all the information on the mosque of the city and another copy would go to IS, and this copy would also have a photograph of the soldier (of Ansar al-Islam) and a video with flash memory where the brother would be shown without any cover on his face, he would say his name, position and his aversion to Ansar al-Islam straight to the camera, and this would be send to them (IS)!!! Isn’t this what you call a decent work of intelligence within IS? And almost everyone whom they captured (of Ansar al-Islam) and whom these videos of have been recorded were after a few days of this happening imprisoned by (Nuri) Al-Maliki and most of them also have been executed or they still wait to be executed and you’ll see that IS is also full with prisoners. And they (IS) became so (full of enmity) that one day when Ansar al-Islam placed an IED bomb, and they started to camp for it (waiting until an enemy vehicle will pass the IED), and there was an IS soldier and he came and he changed the position of the IED so the (enemy) hummer would not be exposed to the explosion of it. After that the brothers went back to the bomb to correct it’s position and an ISIS vehicle approached the brothers while shooting at them and then the vehicle would escape to a barrier of the Rafidi (Shia) military (He means the Iraqi army of course)!!! And they would pass by it (the writer is indicating that there was some truce between the army and ISIS)!!!
And also in Kirkuk, the soldiers of Ansar al-Islam went to throw mortars on the army (Iraqi) and then a vehicle of ISIS came as they made auto light contact with the Iraqi army and they would together fight (against the Ansar al-Islam). And all these kind of operations that have been conducted against the Ansar al-Islam, they were all done because Ansar al-Islam refused to take part in a project that had been commanded by a formal Ba’athi and a current powerful men in the government of Maliki, (the command) went through Abu Aqil the leader of ISIS in Mosul. And this project was going about a partnership with some members of the Maliki government against some other members of the (same) government. They wanted from Ansar al-islam while giving them a sum of money their partnership in killing some governmental members and letting some others alive. And this offer of money is the same as with ISIS, they partner up with some members of the government against other members of the government. And I will now talk about them with a small example:
Atheel and Usama al-Nujaifi pay ransoms to ISIS with in return that ISIS will not target them. With the fact that they (Atheel and Usama) are a part of the Maliki government. Atheel Al-Nujaifi ruled Mosul 3 periods after each other and all that time that he ruled Mosul he was never a targeted to be killed by ISIS while in Anbar the opposite happened with the governor of Anbar. ISIS performed 7 operations against the governor there with 1 of the operation to be as a suicide mission to kill the governor. As regard Ansar al-Islam then they conducted 5 operations against Atheel (the governor of Mosul) and Allah didn’t estimate those operations to succeed. And every time ISIS comes with threats and that they want to take revenge on them (Ansar al-Islam) because they try to kill him (the governor). These are just some of the stories between Ansar al-Islam and ISIS, and it were the Ansar whom received and welcomed Sheikh (Abu Musab) Al-Zarqawi May God have mercy upon him in the training camp of Jibal Kurdistan (the mountain of Kurdistan) before the start of the American invasion in Iraq. Some leaders of Ansar Al-Islam went before the (American) invasion to Afghanistan and they would request muhajireen (foreign Islamic fighters) to come to Iraq for the establishment of an Iraqi Islamic state, so they choose Al-Zarqawi and so Sheihk al-Zarqawi went along with the mujahidin of Ansar al-Islam to Kurdistan and they opened a training camp under the supervision of Nurudeen al-Ordoni (the Jordanian). May Allah lead him/show him the good wherever (the good) is. And Ansar Al-Islam were great people that welcomed the muhajireen (foreign Islamic fighters) and they were the reason for the beginning of the Iraqi Jihad right after the invasion. But IS never and never will preserve the good as it is the custom of the Ba’ath. Some people even think that we are against the uprising of an Islamic state and this is a wrong understanding. We are against the oppressing of Muslims in the name of the Islamic state, and we are against the Ba’athist infiltration of an Islamic entity and that they (the Ba’ath) will rule the Muslims in the name of religion.
Tweets on 8 April 2014
We have received news from a survivor of Daesh Baghdadi’s prisons that Sheikh Abu Abdulaziz al-Qatari was kept as a prisoner in Al-Atarib’s [a city in Northern Aleppo] prison, and then he was transferred to Al-Raqqa, and Sheikh Abu Abdulaziz al-Qatari remained alive, and the last news is that last month, in Raqqa, we called to negotiate for the clearance of his charges and to negotiate its release, but remained differences that caused the abduction from Daesh.
Tweets on 9 April 2014
Sheikh Abu Abed al-Aziz played a pivotal role in the global jihad (effort) in general, and the Levant jihad (effort) particularly. He is in the Levant a defense line; the Sheikh undertook decisions that undermined ISIS and showed its true nature, that was hidden from Sheikh Abi Abed al-Aziz, as others from “al-Qaeda” (or “headquarters”, need context check). Abu Abed al-Aziz reported what he saw and heard from the leaders of ISIS to the factions that he mediates between, most notably Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Baghdadi’s anger towards Abu Abed Al-Aziz is like his anger towards any other Islamist that the parties gather around, which makes it hard to gather them in the hard times when needed.
ISIS has two faces (sides), one is Takfiri and external, and the other Ba’athist and holds no values to it. Both of them are totally refused by society. For both the faces of ISIS have benefit in fighting the leaders and gives them up to the regimes, as they did before with Sheikh Abi Saad al-Hadrami.
Bashar Al-Assad announced, in an interview, the arrest of his intelligence of Abi Saad Al-Hadrami through his loyals in Al-Raqqa. And after three months, his arrest was discovered that it was from ISIS not from the regime. And when they were exposed, ISIS announced a report that it had executed Abi Saad (Al-Hadrami) because he rebelled. It deliberately forgot the fact that they gave him up to the regime as it never happened. ISIS never gave any picture of Abi Saad Al-Hadrami when he was executed, although they boasted killing Muslims and that proves his delivery to the regime of Bashar.
When Abu Safiyya Al-Yamani investigated the two security guards of ISIS, and tried to hold them accountable for breaking the laws, citing murders and assassination, he received an order for his arrest. And then a statement for his martyrdom came up.
When Abu Shaayb Al-Masri investigated the security guards of ISIS, he was arrested and was awaiting his execution like the rest who was executed without reason.
The Sheikh Abou Abed Al-Aziz met Jamal Maarouf and then went to mean the leaders of ISIS. And then he went out of the controlled regions of the criminal Maarouf and disappeared. The criminal Jamal Maarouf admitted publicly the killing of the immigrants and throwing them in dug-up trenches (or “wells”) because they are the followers of ISIS. So why deny? ISIS is the only one benefiting from hiding the Sheikh. That is despite it delivering him to the regime of Bashar so he can give him as a bargaining chip to the Americans.
The news of the hostages were worrisome, that they got out by a deal stricken with ISIS, that they heard the title of the Sheikh being thrown around by his takers (prison guards) and that they never saw him with their own eyes. We ask the security of ISIS that took part in killing and kidnapping the leaders of the Mulims that they release Abu Abed Al-Aziz Al-Qatari, and show his corpse, and Abu Saad Al-Hadrami, if they were to true to their word that they killed him.
Tweets on 12 April 2014
Al-Ajeel tribe was one of the government’s main columns in Azaz (Rural Aleppo). One of ‘Ajeel’s tribal leaders whose name is Rajab Eissa is one of the biggest drug dealers, he is also a known Ba’athist. This tribal-leader’s children have been also known as Ba’athists, Shabiha and government supporters since the 80s. #ISIS_emirs Rajab Eissa had a son called Fawaz. Fawaz is the leader of their family in crime and thuggery. Fawaz appeared in a video at the beginning of the revolution where he was dragging a Muslim attached to the back of his car through the streets of #Aleppo. Fawaz Rajab Eissa also led a convoy composed of more than vehicles belonging to the government’s military and political security forces into the protesting areas (this was before the war started).
Fawaz kept murdering, and arresting the Muslim youths until the fall of Azaz on the hands of the rebels. The arrested protestors would be delivered to various Syrian security agencies. After the fall of Azaz Fawaz fled and starting working as a brigand for ISIS, he then went on to join Northern Storm Battalion (NSB). It’s known that there are some honourable people in NSB, however, most of them are thieves, shabiha and brigands (like the Daeshi Fawaz, for example). Fawaz very leniently killed people and especially when he’s stealing from people.
When ISIS and NSB had an altercation due to ISIS attempting to steal NSB’s share of the spoils from Menigh Military Airbase among other reasons. When ISIS successfully managed to take over the spoils, a fight happened between the two groups that forced NSB to flee to Turkey. ISIS proceeded to take over NSB’s bases and weaponry caches. This event caused the NSB related shabiha cliques to collapse, it also caused Fawaz to disappear.
Upon Fawaz’s return, he realized that he was wanted by all of the rebel courts and organisations. In-order for Fawaz to protect himself, he contacted ISIS, and ISIS saw in Fawaz the type of misguided person who would attack rebel groups, islamists and other Jihadi organisations in the name of Islam. ISIS demanded Fawaz to pledge allegiance to their state and to formally join them. Fawaz a former Shabiha, drug-dealer and brigand proceeded to join the terror group and become the Emir of Azaz in-order to uphold Allah’s law and spread the correct faith (it’s written sarcastically in Arabic).
Today Fawaz Rajab al-Eissa is one of ISIS’ main ‘columns’, he has become a military commander in ISIS. And Fawaz is a person who has taken part in killing the Islamic Front’s rebel commanders and soldiers. We have already spoken about a number of ISIS’ shabiha like the ilk of al-Alwani, Fawaz al-Eissa, Saddam al-Jamal and Abu ‘Aqeel. Soon we will talk about Abu Mariam al-Iraqi and Abu al-Atheer.
Tweets on 17 April 2014
Al-Milbiyah checkpoint [near Regiment 121] of Bashar [al Assad’s] regime at the entrance of the city of Al-Hasakah facilitated the passage of a Daesh column [of vehicles/armour, etc] to enter al-Shadadi to fight the mujahideen. Meanwhile, al-Sukhnah checkpoint facilitated the passage of a Daesh column during their attempt to break into al-Bukamal to fight the mujahideen who put pressure in Deir Ezzor.
Al-Baghdadi is entrenched among the people of Raqqa. He sends most of his mercenaries to fight the mujahideen in Deir Ezzor and other [towns] because he feels safe in al-Raqqa among the civilians.
As we mentioned before, the Ba’athists of al Baghdadi send the Muhajireen to die on the hands of the mujahideen so as to be depleted in order to ease [the pressure] on the regime of Bashar from the fighting against the truthful [mujahideen]. The deaths among Al-Baghdadi’s [men] in Deir Ezzor alone reached 566, while 700 were injured, over the past few days. Their health conditions are very bad, especially the Muhajireen of them. Did Daesh kill in all of Syria and Iraq 566 in a whole year of war against the infidel regimes? Or is fighting the mujahideen a worthier pursuit?
To the families of the muhajireen, did you send your sons to fight for the sake of God and enter paradise or for the sake of al-Baghdadi and the Ba’ath and end in hell? For Jihad to stay on the right path, globally and in the Levant, the head of the snake in al-Raqqa has to be eliminated, and the style of security operations must be used against them.
Tweets on 20 April 2014
Daesh released the French journalists in return for money without an attempt to free a single Muslim from its two states—Iraq and the Levant [who’re in detention]. We call on Daesh to free Sheikh Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Qatari in return for money—the way they did with the French—and they can demand any sum on the condition he is released safe and sound in Syria.
Quoting jihadist factions in Syria, Brother Abu Ahmad al-Iraqi offered an open sum to any [Daesh] member who turns himself in and give information on the whereabouts of Sheikh Abu abd al-Aziz and documents proving his information are correct in addition to [indicating] who took part in the arrest of Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Qatari.
If he turns himself in and pointed to the location he will be safe and will get a huge financial sum on the condition of having evidence as to his truthfulness.
Tweets on 26 April 2014
There are news that Al-Baghdadi and Al-Anbari have exited Raqqa and are heading to Iraq with 300 of their gang, leaving all the immigrants [foreign ISIS members] in Deir Ezzor to die without any direction or plan.
There are news that the Ba’athist Bashar regime [Syrian regime] will be handed the whole of Raqqa soon, and it’s now amassing around it, that in coinciding with cutting the electrical power suggests that this is a plan by the Ba’thist Bashar regime and the Ba’th State in Iraqi and Levant [meaning ISIS] to hand Raqqa over to the regime after the withdrawal of Al-Baghdadi.
All the jihadist groups in Syria and especially in Raqqa should mobilize their fighters and prepare them to abort that plan and liberate Raqqa once again and storm it before it’s handed over to the regime as precautionary measures to prevent the regime from returning to Raqqa after emptying it from ISIS thugs. There must a real operation room with authority and supply lines to return Raqqa to the real Islam [writing implying comparison to ISIS’s Islam] and preventing its handing over to Bashar et al.
Tweets on 3 May 2014
After al-Zawahiri’s leaked speech by hackers of Al-Fajr Centre, in which the sheikh [Zawahiri] has answered sheikh Saba’i’s questions asked about a month ago. After this speech was leaked, ISIS has attacked Deir Ezzor from multiple axes (Bariha and Al-Subha), so Jabhat Al-Nusra responded to the attack to repel them, without Nusra attacking ISIS first.
Al-Nusra has killed 30 ISIS thugs and liberated Al-Subha and Bariha and repelled the attack on these two axes. Al-Nusra as well repelled an ISIS attack in Deir Ezzor on Al-Shamyya axis and killed 40 of ISIS Ba’th thugs. Also on Ruawyshed axis, Al-Nusra repelled an ISIS attack and killed 22 of them and the rest fled and left anti-air weapons.
Another new old news in Deir Ezzor is that some thugs from Thiban have pledged intelligence to ISIS, including an Assad regime operative called Adeeb Mas’oud. After Thiban pleged allegiance, ISIS has attacked Al-Nusra again, and the attacked was repelled and 40 ISIS were killed and the rest have fled. Total ISIS killed in the attacks yesterday and today on Deir Ezzor has reached at least 120, and now they’re requesting a truce with Al-Nusra to evacuate their dead. Most of ISIS leaders in Deir Ezzor are thugs who deal with Bashar’s regime, and they throw the foreign fighters into this needless war. ISIS leaders, who are operatives for the Ba’th regime, work on the attrition of foreign fighters to shift the focus from fighting Bashar to fighting the mujahideen, which is what’s happening now.
Tweets on 12 May 2014
Some ISIS defectors have told us that the “Sururi Wikileaks” Twitter account [@SROOR800] is actually an account maintained by ISIS activists where they publish disinformation [pretending it’s coming from anti-ISIS activists]. Those who maintain the account all have the ISIS mentality and have secret communication with ISIS leadership.
The account’s maintainers are three:
- Abdulaziz Salem al-Omar (Intelligence source)
- Abdulrahman Sultan al-Mu’ajjel
- Abdullah al-Fayez (most dangerous of them, both financially and ideologically)
The first one, Abdulaziz Salem al-Omar, is in an old man in his seventies, his task is collecting intelligence. The second one al-Mu’ajjel, his task is spying intel. The most dangerous one is the third, Abdullah al-Fayez. According to the intel [we received], his roles are in media, agitation [encouraging for jihad], and financial. He works for ISIS in secrecy and lives in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. He stopped using his real name on Twitter and his secret activities are strong to unit ISIS [supporters] in Saudi Arabia.
Tweets on 17 May 2014
According to the information coming to us from many ISIS defectors, we’ll soon publish a detailed exposé of the activities of ISIS’s 20 most dangerous activists in Saudi Arabia. Those characters [the activists] have various tasks, some in media, some in religious matters, some are agitators [encouraging for jihad], and some do intelligence work, of different ages, and many of them are ex-cons. There also other ISIS characters about whom we received very detailed information, but the information suggests that they’re not currently active, so we won’t publish any information on them until we’re sure they’re back working for ISIS.
Tweets on 23 May 2014
We start with our information on character #1 that works for ISIS in Saudi Arabia, but this doesn’t mean we’re starting with the most dangerous one, but rather according to the information’s availability. This character is Abdulaziz Salem al-Oma, Saudi, older than 60, and used to work in the Saudi Ministry of Education as an accountant. He was active [politically] until he was imprisoned for a few months due to his political writings. During his imprisonment, he met people who have Al-Baghdadi’s ideology.
A famous Saudi sheikh, Abdulrahman, has negotiated his release, after which he started abandoning his previous relationships and started new relationship with Takfiris. He had many relations with many Saudi sheikhs and Imams, he made enemies out of them, and started leaking their information to ISIS. He was fighting against the most Saudi anti-ISIS sheikhs and Imams claiming they’re Sururis [followers of Muhammad Surur]. He used to tell his buddies: “My mission for the rest of my life is to expose them, especially Naser Al-Omar”. He because like a godfather for Al-Baghdadi’s group in Saudi Arabia, and a central source for information on accounts claiming to be against ISIS under Sururis names.
He gathers around him many ISIS supporters such as Abdulrahman Sultan Al-Mu’ajjel, about whom we’ll dedicate future episodes. Abdulaziz Al-Omar started using his organizational knowledge to unite ISIS supporters and activists, and bring them to him, such as Hamoud Al-Mateeri, Naser Al-Thaqeel, Al-Fayez, and Alewi Al-Shummari. Abdulaziz Salem Al-Omar is an expert on electronic publishing as he was previous imprisonment was due to him writing on internet forums, and was released with the mediation of Saudi sheikhs, after which he declared them as enemies.
ISIS in Saudi Arabia has many branches with which Al-Omar is linked, such as in Riyadh, and Tameer town (close to Riyadh), Al-Kharj, Ha’el, Al-Sharqyya, Bareeda, Sharura, Al-Ta’ef, and Mecca. Abdulaziz Salem Al-Omar is essentially the leader and godfather of the group in Riyadh along with Ali Al-Jabaali (known as Abdulrahman Al-Mu’ajjel), Abdullah Al-Fayez, and others.
As for the group in Al-Kharj, it’s lead by Hamoud Mu’eed Al-Mateeri along with obscure characters. The group in Tameer town is lead by Hamad Rayyes Al-Rayyes, and he’s considered as a religious symbol in ISIS in Saudi Arabia, and he has mobile phones [could be phone numbers] supporting the groups in Al-Kaseem and Ha’el, the details of which we’ll mention later.
The group in Al-Ha’el’s leader is Alewi Al-Shummari and Khaled Abbas, and others we’ll mention details about them in future episodes according to the information we received from ISIS defectors. The information is mainly about the spiritual, media, logistics, financial, and intelligence leaders, and how the whole operation is managed. We received many requests to stop publishing some of the names because they stopped supporting ISIS, and some of the requests told us that this is private secrets. We’ll stop mentioning any character on whom we have information that they stopped supporting ISIS, and those who go back to supporting ISIS we’ll publish all the information we have on them, especially those who are active in the media, intelligence, and agitation, because ISIS uses a lot of media and intelligence deception against whom they call their enemies, and they have fatwas that lying is halal if its for their own good.
Tweets on 3 June 2014
Today’s personality is Abd al-Rahman Sultan Mohammad al-Meaagal (Me-a-gal), he has belonged to Baghdadi’s state organisation for many years. Even though he didn’t have much contribution militarily, he had very strong connection with the organisation and provided large financial support, he was seized by Saudi authorities for his connections, he used to work in the Saudi ministry of health and after serving his jail time he resumed his communication with the organisation through a middle man. Al-Meaagal adopts the ideas of all the Islamist leaders and blasphemes al-Qaeda and many sheiks and permits killing them and setting off explosions inside Muslim countries, he became extreme over point to the point that his family completely disowned him, to this day he has strong relations with activists of Baghdadi’s state abroad.
He received thousands of hundreds (money) from the internal affair ministry after being jailed for years and he kept it secret because he was scared that he would be blasphemed by the followers of al-Baghdadi. In order to maintain the support to al-Baghdadi he continued his financial support during these pasts’ months. He also recruited (brainwashed) people and youths to participate in meeting run by Saudi sheiks to record their opinions and views.
The Saudi sheiks had a meeting in the house of the Saudi Mohamad al-Arify, one of the Saudis was Mohamad Faraj, as well as many others, one of the attendees was a young man called Amr Abd al-Aziz al-Arify, al-Meaagal exploited this young man and took information off and published it with his colleagues in an account for disputed sheiks called the Sororyeen.
At the age of 50 al-Meaagal still recruits (implied brainwashing in the word used) young men and sends them to Saudi sheiks to gather information regarding them, he convinces the young man that what they’re doing is a jihad through a fatwa he declared! El Meaagal pretends that he has stopped after his Saudi friend Bandar al-Shaalan was arrested/apprehended ( word used implies sudden/disappearance in secret without anyone knowing, no court etc…) in fear of his own safety, however he still continues his work with al-Baghdadi organisation with strength.
Al-Meaagal suffers from his social isolation, especially from his sons who altogether disagree with his ideologies and the distancing of Daeshenians (ISIS members) from him because his works and outspoken opinions were exposed, in fear of getting arrested (Extracted/disappearance etc… same as above). Al-Meaagal has a strong connection to Abd al-Rahman al-Marzooky who is the most dangerous Daeshi in Syria, who considers al-Meaagal the eye of Daeshian ideology in Saudi Arabia.
The Iraqi branch of Daesh considers him one of the most important who will organise the work inside Saudi Arabia through cooperation with Abd al-Rahman al-Marzooky with whom al-Meaagal meets up frequently together with the Senior Saudis of Daesh in complete Secrecy at the Rests (word in Arabic implies rests presents on Roads between two major cities) East the City of Riyadh, sometimes in the desert and other times in the house of Abd al-Aziz Amr. He also meets up with Daesh member that we are yet to reveal like al-Garis, Tamim al-Kady, al-Shabib Adnan al-Shaalan and some of his family members, Abd Allah al-Fayez, Hamoud al-Motery and al-Gebaly.
Al-Meaagal believes in the Daeshian ideology of assassinating the Sheiks and he goes beyond his believes and assassinates others as well. Now he lives the absolute belief in Baghdadi’s allegiance and propagates this belief. He says In meetings that believe there is no Saudi Religious Scholars except apostates and strays and he mentions Bin Baz and Bin othymin when others are mentioned.
We will mention the meeting places of al-Meaagal and what goes on there and how they plan and execute these meetings.
Soon we will mention the most active member of Daesh in Saudi Arabia and he is the Saudi Abd Allah al-Fayez and his role in the Whatsapp Groups and his Strong relationship with Nasser al-Thakeel and we will talk about al-Fayez’s journeys outside of Riyadh, especially al-Qassim and his silliness by making Whatsapp Groups to amass allegiance towards al-Baghdadi.
We will also talk about his places of meeting with the Daeshy organisation in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh and the desert and the personalities that he communicates with from Daesh in Syria and his dismissal by the Saudi sheiks Egs. Sheik al-Alwan and al-Tarifi and his relationship with the Saudi Sheik Fahd al-Kady who gave him his daughter to marry. We will also talk about his financial relationship with Daesh and his role in organising demonstrations through what’s app groups for young men and woman in the Saudi cities Riyadh and al-Qassim. We will also talk about his fatwas to the followers of Daesh on twitter by banning requesting the release of the Saudi Sheik al-Alwan for he is an enemy of Daesh and Sorory (part of the Sororyeen mentioned above) and the date of joining baghdadi in Iraq, how he was injured, how he entered Saudi Arabia, how he was arrested and his relationship with Daesh today!
Tweets on 9 June 2014
Ibrahim Awwad Al-Sumeiri aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi disappeared from the public since 2 months, and sources told us that he used to pray on Fridays with a disguise, no one knowing about this except a few, but he has disappeared completely for the first time. And we’re told that he went to take part in military operations. When his absence grew, there were disturbances among IS leadership, which lead to the Iraqi named Abu Ali al-Anbari taking charge, telling people that he is in charge while Baghdadi is taking care of more important matters.
Some IS leadership lead by Abu al-Atheer informed al-Anbari that they wanted clarification of Baghdadi’s fate, or else the leadership will have to be decided or there will be defections. Al-Anbari tried to prove that Baghdadi is still in charge. He round up the lower leadership and entered with 5 disguised men. Then he reassured them of their goals and vision and the problems facing IS and what the solutions were.
After the 5 men exited, he told them that Baghdadi was one of the men and that he came to listen to them discuss this and hear their concerns but due to security reasons he could not show himself. This was a step to try to prove he is still in charge, and that the upper leadership is still intact.
New rumors emerged that Baghdadi is either dead or has been seriously wounded in the last two months, and due to the rumors being spread a group of upper leadership went into hiding which included the Saudi cleric Abu Bakr al-Qahtani.
Tweets on 13 June 2014
A meeting between Daesh and the Naqshbandi Army has finished near Qayyarah district, south of Mosul. Representatives from Izzat al-Douri and al-Baghdadi attended the meeting. They discussed administration of battles and that military leadership and civilian project plans are received from a united leadership headed by Izzat al-Douri.
It was agreed to not make the military and judicial leadership of Daesh in Iraq non-Iraqi and the expulsion of any non-Iraqi leader from Iraq. It was also agreed that former officers would be in charge of military leadership in Daesh in Iraq. The military leadership of Daesh of Iraq is previous officer who were nominated before (the entrance) of leaders under Izzat al-Douri, and without permission of non-Iraqi fighters of Daesh of Iraq of more than 20% from their Iraqi group. And that they are but leaders.
Daesh established moving 5% of captured military vehicles from Maliki’s army to Syria to protect Iraq from al-Qaeda entering (Iraq) from there. And it was agreed that in the event of the fall of Baghdad, Izzat al-Douri will be appointed as a replacement in case the international community defeats Daesh. And Daesh is to continue the armed work until annihilation of foreigners in their midst with help from assisting officers in the Naqshbandi army under al-Douri. And any foreigner who stays in Iraq, his purification is by a suicide operation. Or they will move to fight in Syria against al-Qaeda to protect the stability of Iraq from them. Izzat al-Douri’s army is charged with protecting with security forces the leadership of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and their safety at the commanding outposts for the success of the revolution.