If Assad Murdered His Own Brother-In-Law To Survive, What Wouldn’t He Do?

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on December 19, 2014

Defence Minister Daoud Rajha, General Assef Shawkat and General Hassan Ali Turkmani

Defence Minister Daoud Rajha, General Assef Shawkat and General Hassan Ali Turkmani

Sam Dagher at the Wall Street Journal has identified the July 18, 2012, bombing, which killed four senior Assad regime officials, most seriously Assef Shawkat, as the turning point in Syria. After that, the level of the killing rose, the minorities, especially the Alawis, closed ranks around the regime, and the country was opened up to Iran.

Dagher certainly has the timing correct. It was the late summer, and most noticeably the fall of 2012, when the death toll in Syria markedly increased. 5,000 people had been killed in all of 2011, and another 5,000 by May 2012. By September 2012, 30,000 people were dead, the kill-rate now reaching 5,000-per-month. By January 2013, 60,000 people were dead, a kill-rate of 10,000-per-month. Nobody really knows what the total, let alone the rate, is now, but this was when it spiked. This period is also concurrent with the massive operation mounted by Clerical Iran to rescue the Bashar dictatorship.

Given how beneficial this bombing was to the regime, there have long been rumours it was an inside job—and the excellent recent report by Naame Shaam said exactly this, that this was an Iranian-orchestrated counter-intelligence operation to snuff-out the softliners within the regime who were trying to reach a deal with the protesters and rebels inside the country and their Gulf Arab patrons, which would have involved some concessions from the regime on its absolute control.

Dagher presents the evidence from “[t]wo dozen people, including past and current regime officials, opposition leaders, activists and rebels, and politicians in neighboring countries with ties to Mr. Assad.” These include Walid Jumblatt and Manaf Tlass, who defected two weeks before the bombing when six explosive devices were found outside Tlass’ office on a base in Damascus. A crucial claim from Tlass is that Qassem Suleimani was in Damascus at the time of the bombing, which would support Naame Shaam’s timeline. An opposition activist, now in Turkey, says the rebels couldn’t have done this: “If you asked me then, I would have lied to you and told you, ‘Our heroic rebels did it.’ But now I can tell you, ‘No, we were amateurs back then’.”

The primary target—whoever did this—was, of course, Assef Shawkat, married to Assad’s sister, who “had previously headed Military Intelligence—one of Syria’s most feared institutions—and commanded a loyal group of officers.” Within the dreaded inner circles of the regime, Shawkat had reach into the two most important: the very core of the family that owns Syria, which includes Bashar’s mother Anissa, thought of by many Syrians as “a combination between Lady MacBeth and Connie Corleone,” Bashar’s brother Maher, and the Makhloufs, and the circle around them comprising the security barrons and intelligence chiefs. Shawkat was also the regime’s most senior overseer of the relationship with Iran/Hizballah and al-Qaeda/Islamic State. If there was a rival within the regime, someone whom the military-intelligence establishment—which thinks Bashar bungled the response to the uprising—was eyeing up as a successor it was Shawkat, probably with some role for Maher, providing a motive for the dictator to neutralise him.

Buttressing the claim that this was the regime/Iran shutting down the softliners in the elite, Tlass says that he and Shawkat “were among those calling for talks with both peaceful and armed regime opponents.” This is rather at odds with the meeting one of Syria’s most distinguished dissidents, Ammar Abdulhamid, had with Shawkat, where Shawkat said: “we will burn [Syria] down rather than give it up.” This was in 2005, however, and perhaps Shawkat had had a change of heart in the meantime.

In its effects, this bombing certainly helped the regime. At the very moment the regime seemed to be reeling, with both major cities ablaze, this shored-up the regime base by frightening the minorities and pulled in an Iranian occupation force to spare the dictator the retribution he had so richly earned.

Whatever the truth of this specific incident turns out to be, it is very interesting to see this in the Wall Street Journal. The spooky, covert side of what the Assad regime has done in its quest to maintain power has gotten far too little attention and has even been dismissed by some as “conspiracy theories”. But here is a mainstream, credible report that Assad murdered his own brother-in-law to consolidate his regime. If Westerners can get clear in their minds a regime capable of that—and relying on manipulating the population into supporting it by frightening them with the alternative—then perhaps there is hope that before it is too late they will see through the Assad regime’s manipulation of the Salafi-jihadists, too.

In Algeria in the 1990s, the regime destroyed all moderates—assassinating all the academic, liberal oppositionists, for example—in the first months of the rebellion. Le Pouvoir then lured foreign jihadists into Algeria, seized control of the insurgency, and drove it into the dead-end of takfirism and mass-murder to discredit its cause among the people. It worked. It took years to get the defectors to testify, but testify they did. In Syria, we have defectors like Bassem Barabandi, a defector from Assad’s Foreign Ministry, testifying in real time. Perhaps now they will be listened to, and this ruinous course of believing Assad is a bulwark against Islamic terrorism, rather than its godfather, can be abandoned.

Update: It had seemed clear to me that Shawkat was the target of the bombing, but Dagher confirmed this after the article was published.

4 thoughts on “If Assad Murdered His Own Brother-In-Law To Survive, What Wouldn’t He Do?

  1. Pingback: What To Do About Syria: Sectarianism And The Minorities | The Syrian Intifada

  2. Pingback: America’s Silent Partnership With Iran And The Contest For Middle Eastern Order: Part Two | The Syrian Intifada

  3. Pingback: Shi’a Holy War and Iran’s Jihadist Empire | The Syrian Intifada

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